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Labor Pains: Change in Organizational 
Models and Employee Turnover in Young, 
High-Tech Firms' 
James N. Baron and Michael T. Hannan 
Stanford University 
M. Diane Burton 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
Organizational theories, especially ecological perspectives, empha- 
size the disruptive effects of change. However, the mechanisms pro- 
ducing these effects are seldom examined explicitly. This article ex- 
amines one such mechanism-employee turnover. Analyzing a 
sample of high-technology start-ups, we show that changes in the 
employment models or blueprints embraced by organizational lead- 
ers increase turnover, which in turn adversely affects subsequent 
organizational performance. Turnover associated with organiza- 
tional change appears to be concentrated among the most senior 
employees, suggesting "old guard disenchantment" as the primary 
cause. The results are consistent with the claim of neoinstitutionalist 
scholars that founders impose cultural blueprints on nascent organ- 
izations and with the claim of organizational ecologists that altering 
such blueprints is disruptive and destabilizing. 
INTRODUCTION 
Models of the employment relationship play an important-if not always 
explicit-role in contemporary theories of organizations. Notwithstanding 
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their other differences, numerous perspectives affirm the idea that organ- 
izations embrace particular culturally accepted logics or blueprints for 
organizing, including a model of how employment relations should be 
structured. These models are claimed, in turn, to guide subsequent or- 
ganizational evolution and to be resistant to change. For instance, in 
discussing organizational inertia, population ecologists have argued that 
survival prospects are enhanced by organizational features that promote 
reliability and accountability, including a coherent system for managing 
employees: "Testing for accountability is especially intense during organ- 
ization building.... When membership involves an employment relation, 
potential members often want guarantees that careers within the organ- 
ization are managed in some rational way" (Hannan and Freeman 1984, 
p. 153). Among the most important factors in fostering reliability and 
accountability, according to organizational ecologists, are clearly specified 
forms of authority and well-understood bases of exchange between mem- 
bers and the organization. Hence, organizations stand to benefit by de- 
veloping and institutionalizing coherent blueprints for employment re- 
lations that can foster reliability and accountability; once such a blueprint 
gets adopted, it is risky and costly for organizations to alter it. 
Neoinstitutional perspectives also emphasize the importance of nor- 
mative or cultural blueprints in shaping organization building and or- 
ganizational evolution (e.g., Guillen 1994; Fligstein and Byrkjeflot 1996). 
According to these accounts, the designers of organizations draw on cul- 
turally appropriate templates and conceptions of control in crafting struc- 
tures, work roles, and employment relations because this enhances or- 
ganizational legitimacy and because their own prior socialization and 
enculturation presumably preclude doing otherwise (Fligstein 1987, 1990). 
Organizational economists have made similar arguments about the 
value of distinctive and coherent human-resources systems and their in- 
ertial tendencies (Milgrom and Roberts 1995). Organizations benefit from 
a coherent, consistent, and well-understood philosophy and set of practices 
governing human resource management because: (1) they benefit from 
technical complementarities among specific personnel practices (Milgrom 
and Roberts 1992, chap. 4)-for instance, investments in training increase 
the value of policies that reduce turnover, and vice versa; (2) learning is 
simplified and accelerated; and (3) the organization can more readily dif- 
ferentiate itself from competitors, helping it attract workers well-suited 
to the kinds of jobs and values the firm has on offer. These benefits are 
particularly likely to be realized when the organization's model (e.g., an 
consin, the University of Chicago, and the Wharton School, none of whom should be 
blamed for any remaining defects in the finished product. Direct correspondence to 
James N. Baron, Graduate School of Business, Stanford University, Stanford, Cali- 
fornia 94305-5015. E-mail: baron_james@gsb.stanford.edu 
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ironclad bureaucracy or a familial clan) resonates with behavioral scripts 
or blueprints familiar to prospective and current employees from their 
experiences in other settings (Baron and Kreps 1999, chap. 3). Yet strong 
complementarities and interdependencies among various facets of an or- 
ganization's model make changes in any particular element more difficult 
and costly. 
These various arguments suggest that organizational models regarding 
employment relations should be resistant to change and that efforts to 
redraw blueprints should be disruptive. Indeed, according to organiza- 
tional ecologists, efforts to alter the premises governing employment re- 
lations should be among the most disruptive types of organizational 
change. Changes in these premises can obsolesce skills and routines that 
employees have learned, alter bases of power and status within the or- 
ganization, and violate the implicit or explicit contracts specifying the 
expectations and entitlements of employees vis-a-vis the firm. Therefore, 
efforts by firms to implement change along these dimensions should in- 
crease discord and employee turnover. For instance, consider recent efforts 
by health care organizations to implement performance evaluation and 
reward systems for physicians based on patient volume. These changes 
have proved enormously contentious and sparked unionization efforts and 
rancor within the profession, precisely because they promote behaviors 
and values that conflict with most physicians' basic premises about their 
role (Greenhouse 1999). 
Yet, the destabilizing effects of fundamental organizational changes 
have been assumed more than tested in organizational research. Numerous 
studies have documented that some type of organizational change (in 
strategy, top leadership, etc.) has deleterious consequences for organiza- 
tional performance or survival (for reviews, see Barnett and Carroll [1995] 
and Carroll and Hannan [2000]), which are often attributed to the internal 
disruption, rancor, and turnover of personnel wrought by changes in val- 
ues, routines, working relationships, and requisite skills. In this article, 
we examine empirically whether changes to the organizational model 
embraced by the founder(s) have disruptive effects, which we operation- 
alize by focusing on labor force turnover and organizational performance. 
Turnover is particularly disruptive in the setting we examine-high-tech 
start-ups in Silicon Valley-for at least two reasons: the acute shortage 
of scientific, technical, and engineering talent facing these organizations; 
and the fact that, for many technology start-ups, employee turnover risks 
losing the firm's most precious asset, its human capital. 
These analyses speak to several important issues for organizational 
scholarship. First, they explore the validity and utility of the notion that 
culturally based scripts, templates, or blueprints are imprinted on organ- 
izations at their founding. In prior research, we have documented the 
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existence of distinct organizational blueprints or models-different sets 
of premises governing the employment relation-among the founders of 
high-technology start-ups in Silicon Valley. We have demonstrated that 
these blueprints shaped various aspects of organizational evolution, in- 
cluding bureaucratization and administrative intensity, the development 
of the HR function, and even the odds of replacing the founder with a 
new chief executive officer (CEO) and of going public (Baron, Burton, 
and Hannan 1996, 1999; Baron, Hannan, and Burton 1999a, 1999b; Han- 
nan, Burton, and Baron 1996; Burton 1995). If these blueprints represent 
part of the "hard wiring" of an enterprise and shape the expectations that 
employees and firms have of one another, then changing the blueprint 
should have demonstrable consequences, including heightened turnover. 
Second, our analyses address the general claim that fundamental change 
destabilizes organizations. Third, labor force turnover is, of course, an 
inherently important organizational outcome, which has received consid- 
erable attention from social scientists (for reviews, see Price [1977] and 
Mobley [1982]). Whatever its relation to performance, turnover surely 
affects organizational life (Staw 1980; Pfeffer 1983). Two otherwise iden- 
tical organizations with persistent differences in turnover will evolve very 
different tenure distributions, with implications for stability and change 
in organizational culture (Carroll and Harrison 1998). Finally, we believe 
the models and methods we employ might prove useful to researchers 
interested in depicting organizational founding conditions and assessing 
their enduring effects. 
We begin by describing the sample, the organizational setting, and our 
typology of employment models. We then formulate and test predictions 
relating labor force turnover to changes in the employment blueprint. We 
assess whether the turnover wrought by changing the employment blue- 
print is disruptive for organizations in two ways: (1) by specifying and 
testing hypotheses concerning how that turnover is patterned (i.e., who 
is most likely to depart); and (2) by analyzing the effects of labor force 
turnover on organizational performance (revenue growth). We test these 
predictions with pooled cross-section time-series data describing annual 
turnover rates and various organizational change events for more than 
100 organizations between 1991 and 1995. 
THE STANFORD PROJECT ON EMERGING COMPANIES (SPEC) 
A panel study of young, high-technology firms in California's Silicon 
Valley, SPEC examines the evolution of employment practices, organi- 
zational designs, and business strategies. The SPEC project seeks to un- 
derstand how human resource systems get established. The focus on firms 
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in a single region and sector of economic activity holds constant key labor 
market and environmental conditions, as well as some of the institutional 
influences asserted to shape labor force turnover. Within the Silicon Valley 
region, we sought industries containing sufficient numbers of comparable 
firms to allow quantitative comparisons; accordingly, we concentrated on 
firms engaged in computer hardware and/or software, telecommunications 
(including networking equipment), medical and biological technologies, 
and semiconductors. We assumed organizations must reach a minimum 
size before needing formal systems or practices; accordingly, we required 
that firms in our study have at least 10 employees when sampled.2 We 
also wanted to understand how founding conditions and early decisions 
affect subsequent organizational evolution, which necessitates information 
about the earliest days of the organization. We assumed individuals could 
only reliably recall fairly recent information; consequently, we limited the 
sample to firms no more than 10 years old when first visited in 1994-95 
(the typical firm was six years old).3 
DATA COLLECTION 
Survey, interview, and archival methods were used to gather information 
on each firm (see Burton 1995). Trained MBA and doctoral students con- 
ducted semistructured interviews with the current CEO. The CEO was 
2 In 1994, we identified 676 technology firms in Silicon Valley founded within these 
industries during the previous ten years and having more than 10 employees, according 
to two commercial databases on Silicon Valley technology companies: Rich's Everyday 
Sales Prospecting Guide (1994); and the Technology Resource Guide to Greater Silicon 
Valley (1993/4), published by CorpTech. From that group, 250 firms were selected 
according to a stratified sampling plan described in Baron, Burton, and Hannan (1996, 
fig. 1). Of the 250 firms to whom we wrote (some of which had gone out of business, 
left the area, or been acquired by the time we contacted them), 109 agreed to participate. 
Utilizing the same sampling frame, we contacted 94 additional companies in 1995 (of 
168 that were added to the 1995 edition of the CorpTech directory); 42 agreed to be 
studied. Finally, we supplemented the sample by contacting 32 very young firms (not 
listed in CorpTech), which we identified by tracking the Silicon Valley business press; 
22 of these firms participated. We further enlarged the sample in 1997-98 by soliciting 
participation from very young firms, including enterprises in the newly emerging In- 
ternet sector. However, we were only able to obtain turnover data for several of these 
firms, whose responses conceivably reflect a different time period, labor market, and 
business environment than the rest of the firms in our sample confronted. Consequently, 
we did not include those several firms in the analyses reported here. 
3 About 10% of firms proved to be more than 10 years old when we first visited them. 
In some cases, for example, our interviews revealed that the inception of the organi- 
zation occurred somewhat earlier than the date of legal incorporation used in con- 
structing our sampling plan. Even employing the most liberal definition of "founding," 
however, only three firms in the sample analyzed here had existed for more than 12 
years when we first visited them. 
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asked to identify the founder (or member of the founding team) best 
equipped to provide information regarding the firm's origins; and the best 
informant regarding human resources (HR) practices in the organization. 
We followed up with these informants about company history and HR 
(respectively) and asked them to return completed surveys to us prior to 
being interviewed. The company history survey solicited details about the 
firm's founding and subsequent milestones. The HR survey sought in- 
formation about workforce demographics and a variety of employment 
policies and practices. Information from the surveys, when available, was 
used to guide interviews with informants in each company. 
FOUNDERS' ORGANIZATIONAL MODELS 
As noted above, recent neoinstitutional work invokes the notion of cul- 
turally based logics, blueprints, scripts, or conceptions of control. Yet 
researchers have seldom tried to operationalize such blueprints directly, 
tending instead to infer their existence from other sources of information. 
Testing the proposition that altering founders' initial blueprints for or- 
ganizing and for structuring employment relations is disruptive demands 
a method for measuring those blueprints. 
In designing the study, we knew from the extant literature that con- 
ceptions of employment relationships could vary along numerous dimen- 
sions, and we were unsure a priori which dimension(s) would be most 
relevant in our setting. Accordingly, we used open-ended interviews to 
gather information. We asked each founder whether he or she had "an 
organizational model or blueprint in mind when (you) founded the com- 
pany." (The CEO was asked a parallel question about the period corre- 
sponding to the date of the interview.) We inductively analyzed transcripts 
of interviews with founders and CEOs. Those analyses indicated that 
interviewee's images regarding how work and employment should be 
organized varied along three main dimensions-attachment, coordination/ 
control, and selection-each characterized by three or four fairly distinct 
options or approaches from which organizational architects seemed to be 
selecting. (For descriptions of these different response categories and il- 
lustrative quotes from interview transcripts, see Burton [1999].) Based on 
the interview transcripts, members of the research team coded or classified 
responses of each founder and each CEO on these three dimensions, unless 
missing data precluded this.4 In previous work, we have shown that these 
4 Two senior researchers on the project independently coded the three dimensions for 
all firms, based on transcripts of interviews with founders and with CEOs. Many 
respondents indicated that more than one option for a dimension was relevant to their 
conception of the employment model; for instance, almost all regarded compensation 
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three dimensions cohere and can be used to characterize the implicit 
organizational model or blueprint of the founder and of the CEO at the 
time our team first visited each firm (for an overview and additional 
details, see Burton [1995] and Baron and Kreps [1999], chap. 19). Here 
we briefly summarize the approach. 
Attachment.-Founders articulated three different bases of employee 
attachment, which we label love, work, and money. Some founders en- 
visioned creating a strong family-like feeling and an intense emotional 
bond with the workforce that would inspire superior effort and increase 
retention of highly sought employees, thereby avoiding the frequent mo- 
bility of key technical personnel that plagues Silicon Valley start-ups. 
What binds the employee to the firm in this model is a sense of personal 
belonging and identification with the company-in a sense, love. Many 
SPEC firms pursue cutting-edge technology, and the primary motivator 
for their employees is the desire to work at the technological frontier. 
Recognizing this, many founders anticipated providing opportunities for 
interesting and challenging work as the basis for attracting, motivating, 
and (perhaps) retaining employees.5 Here, employees were not expected 
to be loyal to the organization, the supervisor, or even coworkers per se, 
but instead to a project. Finally, other founders' responses indicated that 
they regarded the employment relationship as a simple exchange of labor 
for money. 
Basis of coordination and control.-A second dimension concerned the 
principal means of coordinating and controlling work. The most common 
conception involved extensive reliance on informal control through peers 
as relevant to retention, even if they regarded, say, exciting work as more important. 
Hence, the coding task sought to select the option on each dimension that the re- 
spondent indicated as dominant in his/her thinking about the dimension. Some re- 
spondents were unable or unwilling to give priority to one option. Therefore, it was 
important that we use explicit default rules for responses that did not fall neatly into 
one of our categories. We used the following defaults: skills for selection, work for 
attachment, and peer-based control for coordination/control. In effect, this makes the 
engineering model the default (see below). We interpreted the default rules as follows: 
unless the respondent clearly indicated that some other option was more important 
than the default, we coded the response as the default category. After independently 
coding each firm on all three dimensions for the founder and CEO responses, the two 
researchers compared their two sets of codings. In the large majority of cases, they 
were the same. When they were not, we scrutinized the transcripts looking for am- 
biguities that might have led the two coders to disagree. In most cases, we decided 
that the difference was due to some opacity in the response and therefore settled on 
the default code. 
5 A few founders also spoke about providing unrivaled "opportunity" for prospective 
employees. Although opportunity is potentially a conceptually distinct basis of attach- 
ment, it was closely aligned with "challenging work" and there were very few such 




or organizational culture. Other founders intended to rely on professional 
control, even if they did not explicitly use this terminology. They took it 
for granted that workers were committed to excellence in their work and 
could perform at high levels because they had been professionally so- 
cialized to do so. (Not surprisingly, this approach tends to be accompanied 
by an emphasis on hiring high-potential individuals from elite institu- 
tions.) Professional control emphasizes autonomy and independence rather 
than enculturation. A third group of founders espoused a more traditional 
view of control as embedded in formal procedures and systems. Finally, 
some founders indicated that they planned to control and coordinate work 
personally, by direct oversight, reminiscent of Edwards's (1979) descrip- 
tion of the simple-control paradigm that characterized small capitalist 
firms in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. 
Selection.-The third dimension concerns the primary basis for se- 
lecting employees. Some founders' responses suggested that they con- 
ceived of the firm as a bundle of tasks and sought employees to carry out 
particular tasks effectively. Time and money tended to be the paramount 
concerns here, so the focus was on selecting employees who could be 
brought on board and up to speed as quickly and cheaply as possible. In 
these cases, founders envisioned selecting employees having the skills and 
experience needed to accomplish some immediate task(s). Other founders 
focused less on immediate and well-defined tasks than on a series of 
projects (often not yet even envisioned) through which employees would 
move over time. Accordingly, they focused on long-term potential. Finally, 
some founders focused primarily on values and cultural fit, emphasizing 
how a prospective hire would connect with others in the organization. 
Relationships among the three dimensions. These blueprints can be 
classified into three types of attachment and selection and four types of 
control, yielding 3 x 3 x 4 = 36 possible combinations. However, the 
observations cluster into a few cells (see Burton 2001), which we will refer 
to as five basic model types for employment relations, summarized in 
table 1. 
The engineering model involves attachment through challenging work, 
peer group control, and selection based on specific task abilities. This 
model parallels standard descriptions of the default culture among high- 
tech Silicon Valley start-ups (e.g., Saxenian 1994), and it is the modal 
employment blueprint among founders of SPEC firms. The star model 
refers to attachment based on challenging work, reliance on autonomy 
and professional control, and selecting elite personnel based on long-term 
potential. The commitment model entails reliance on emotional-familial 
attachments of employees to the organization, selection based on cultural 
fit, and peer group control. The bureaucracy model involves attachment 
based on challenging work and/or opportunities for development, selecting 
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TABLE 1 
FIVE BASIC EMPLOYMENT MODEL TYPES 
DIMENSIONS 
BASIC MODEL TYPE Attachment Selection Coordination/Control 
Star ................. Work Potential Professional 
Engineering ........ Work Skills Peer/cultural 
Commitment ....... Love Fit Peer/cultural 
Bureaucracy ........ Work Skills Formal 
Autocracy .......... Money Skills Direct 
individuals based on their qualifications for a particular role, and for- 
malized control (for further discussion of this model type, see Baron, 
Hannan, and Burton [1999b], appendix). Finally, the autocracy model 
refers to employment premised on monetary motivations, control and 
coordination through close personal oversight, and selection of employees 
to perform pre-specified tasks. 
We refer to these five blueprints as the basic model types. We do so 
not only because they are the most prevalent combinations observed 
within this sample, but because they also display several other important 
properties. First, each of these blueprints exhibits a high degree of co- 
herence or internal consistency among the three dimensions, suggesting 
that they complement one another to form an overarching system. For 
instance, consider a founder intending to emphasize control and coordi- 
nation through organizational norms and seeking emotional bonds to the 
company itself (rather than attachment based on the specific work as- 
signment), perhaps in order to create overarching goals among differen- 
tiated subunits. Here there would be a clear technical complementarity 
with selection mechanisms that screen for values and cultural fit, as is 
found under the commitment model. Second, these types display cultural 
resonance and salience within this population and its setting. When we 
have described these archetypes to Silicon Valley employers, employees, 
and other knowledgeable parties, they understand the distinctions and 
frequently begin classifying organizations with which they have experi- 
ence in these terms. 
Furthermore, the five basic types reflect different logics of organizing 
within other institutions that actors in this organizational field have ex- 
perienced; indeed, the labels for the types are fairly evocative of the char- 
acteristics. For instance, the star model-particularly prevalent among 
firms developing medical technology or pursuing research6-resonates 
6 Among SPEC firms in the medical technology or research sectors (including bio- 
technology), 42.3% were founded along star model lines, compared to only 1.6% of 
firms in other industry sectors. 
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closely with the model that underlies academic science, from which many 
of the founders and key scientific personnel sought for these start-ups are 
recruited. The commitment model draws instead on familial imagery and 
the revered legend of Hewlett-Packard within Silicon Valley. The engi- 
neering model resonates with the socialization that engineers receive in 
professional school and suits the Valley's highly mobile labor force. The 
bureaucratic model is readily familiar from encounters with bureaucracies 
in numerous contexts. Finally, the austere, no-nonsense autocracy model 
communicates a powerful and consistent message that employees certainly 
have encountered elsewhere before: "You work [for me, the boss], you get 
paid [by me]-nothing more, nothing less." We make no claim that these 
basic model types are generic, or even generalizable outside this popu- 
lation of organizations. Rather, we simply claim that these basic model 
types capture blueprints for organizing that have a systemic quality and 
display cultural resonance within this setting. 
A significant number of companies differed from one (and only one) of 
the basic model types on only one dimension. We will refer to these as 
near-model types. For instance, about 3% of founders envisioned basing 
attachment on love, selecting based on fit, and utilizing direct control. 
This combination represents a near-commitment blueprint: it differs from 
the basic commitment model firm in terms of control (only), and differs 
substantially (i.e., on two or more dimensions) from the other four model 
types. Such an organization suggests an autocratic cult variant on the 
commitment model. Finally, we will use the terms aberrant or nontype 
to refer to all other blueprints-firms in which the blueprint either (1) 
differs from two or more basic model types on one dimension (and does 
not fall into any of the basic types) or (2) differs along two or more 
dimensions from every basic model type. 
Methodological concerns.-This effort to characterize the organiza- 
tional blueprints of entrepreneurs raises a host of conceptual and meth- 
odological issues (see Baron, Hannan, and Burton 1999b). Here we touch 
briefly on several concerns. First, our coding effort and our conceptual- 
ization of organizational blueprints sought to measure the premises of 
founders and CEOs. Blueprints might or might not bear a relationship 
to organizational reality (for some evidence that they do in this sample, 
see Baron et al. 1996). In classifying firms on the three dimensions, we 
took pains to rely not on what respondents claimed they were actually 
doing, but instead on what they recounted about their underlying organ- 
izational model or conception. 
Second, founders might have selectively reconstructed the past. Al- 
though we cannot definitively rule out retrospection bias, some previous 
results provide reassurance on this score. For instance, Baron et al. (1999a) 
reported that the founder's initial organizational blueprint is strongly and 
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systematically related to an objective, independent measure of present- 
day managerial and administrative intensity-suggesting that the bur- 
eaucratization process was path dependent-whereas the current CEO's 
blueprint was unrelated to present-day administrative intensity. If re- 
spondents were selectively tailoring their stories to match or rationalize 
reality, then the responses of present-day CEOs should do a better job of 
predicting present-day organizational arrangements than do founders' 
recollection of their organization-building premises at the start-up phase. 
Furthermore, some founders acknowledged during interviews that their 
original models were naive or ill conceived. Their ability and willingness 
to be self-critical suggests that they were not simply reporting ex post a 
self-serving conception tailored to actual developments. On the other 
hand, given the retrospective nature of founders' accounts and other lim- 
itations of the available data, our findings and inferences regarding the 
effect of changing organizational models should be treated as suggestive, 
not definitive. 
Third, we cannot tell for sure when employment models changed (if 
they did), and hence causality could run in the other direction: firms 
experiencing higher turnover might change their employment models in 
an effort to stem that turnover. Though we cannot rule out this competing 
account, several important pieces of evidence argue against it, as we 
discuss below. 
As noted above, previous research on the SPEC firms has documented 
that founders' initial organizational blueprints shaped not only the evo- 
lution of human resource practices and the HR function, but numerous 
other facets of organizational evolution as well. The fact that founders' 
models predict how firms develop over time provides some evidence of 
the validity of the typology of basic employment models. We can also 
assess whether the taxonomy captures real and meaningful distinctions 
in founders' organization-building templates by examining whether model 
change disrupts the enterprise, as manifested in increased turnover. 
HYPOTHESES 
Effects of Organizational Model and Model Change on Turnover 
It is important to distinguish between two potentially competing effects 
of changing the organizational model on turnover. The first concerns what 
Barnett and Carroll (1995) call the process effects of change: the disruptive 
and destabilizing effects of altering deeply embedded organizational prem- 
ises. If our basic model types in fact capture distinctive systems or recipes 
for organizing, then efforts to change the founder's initial employment 
model should be disruptive. We therefore predict 
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HYPOTHESIS 1.-The more that an organization's blueprint or model 
has changed from what the founder initially envisioned, the higher the 
rate of employee turnover.7 
Barnett and Carroll argue, however, that analysts can gain more precise 
and informative results by also taking account of a second set of effects 
associated with organizational change-which they term content ef- 
fects-which reflect the potential improvement in consistency (and, pre- 
sumably, a concomitant decline in labor force turnover) from abandoning 
an initial model that was incoherent and relatively unfamiliar. (For re- 
views of the evidence on these two types of effects of organizational 
change, see Barnett and Carroll [1995] and Carroll and Hannan [2000], 
chap. 16). In our context, this implies that the potentially disruptive effects 
of model change might depend on an interaction between origins (the 
particular blueprint initially espoused by the founder) and destinations 
(the new blueprint). Altering deeply embedded organizational premises is 
likely to be most disruptive for firms that began with a coherent blueprint 
(i.e., one of the five basic model types). Changing the model should be 
less disruptive for firms that began with an aberrant blueprint. In par- 
ticular, for moves from a nontype blueprint to one of the five basic model 
types, the disruptive effects of change might be more than offset by en- 
hanced consistency of premises governing employment relations, serving 
to dampen turnover. Conversely, moves from one aberrant model to an- 
other presumably engender little or no improvement in consistency to 
offset the disruptive effects of change, leading us to expect that such 
transitions provoke particularly high turnover. 
HYPOTHESIS la.-Changing the employment model increases turnover 
most in organizations that began with one of the basic employment models 
and least in organizations that began with an aberrant (nontype) blueprint. 
HYPOTHESIS lb.-The effect of model change on turnover is larger 
(smaller)for transitions that increase (decrease) afirm's distance from one 
of the basic employment models. 
Some transitions among basic model types are likely to be more dis- 
ruptive than others. We expect that abandoning the commitment and star 
models is particularly destabilizing, especially when the transition is to a 
bureaucratic model. Firms founded along commitment or star lines are 
more likely to bring in a nonfounder CEO and to do so sooner (Hannan 
et al. 1996). Hannan et al. speculate that these two models most strongly 
implicate the founders in implicit contracts with early employees: in star 
firms, star employees are often recruited to the enterprise by a prior per- 
sonal connection to the founder(s); in commitment firms, the founder 
'All hypotheses assume that all other relevant determinants of turnover are held 
constant (i.e., ceteris paribus assumptions apply). 
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represents the central figure in the clan. In contrast, the engineering model 
seems to represent the Silicon Valley default (Saxenian 1994) and to have 
an affinity with bureaucratic culture (Shenhav 1995), suggesting that the 
engineering blueprint might be easier both to reach and to abandon (es- 
pecially if it is being abandoned for bureaucracy) than other models. 
Accordingly, we predict: 
HYPOTHESIS Ic.-Abandoning the commitment or star model is more 
disruptive than abandoning the engineering model, especially for transi- 
tions to the bureaucratic model. 
Among companies that retained their employment blueprint over time, 
it seems reasonable to expect turnover to be particularly low in firms that 
adhered to a commitment model. Conversely, as firms age, grow, and 
become more complex, retaining star or autocracy models might prove 
increasingly contentious-in the former case, due to tension between the 
early stars and the rest of the organization, with whom they are increas- 
ingly interdependent; in the latter case, because autocratic control appears 
increasingly capricious and untenable as enterprises become larger, more 
complex, and more differentiated. Hence, we would expect to see higher 
turnover among firms that have retained a star or autocracy model 
throughout their existence. 
We do not advance predictions about the main effect of founder's em- 
ployment model on turnover. Gross differences in turnover as a function 
of founder's employment model might reflect the fact that some blueprints 
are inherently less stable (i.e., less likely to persist over time) than others. 
As we shall see below, turnover rates differ significantly among founders' 
employment models, even after we control for an extensive array of or- 
ganizational and environmental characteristics. However, the pattern is 
subtle and, in some ways, counterintuitive; it reflects differences in the 
persistence of the various model types as well as their underlying turnover 
propensities. Therefore, rather than offering specific hypotheses, we un- 
ravel the issue empirically below. To capture both the process and content 
effects of organizational change, we examine the effects of changing the 
organizational blueprint per se, supplemented with more fine-grained 
analyses of how turnover varies as a function of stability and change in 
founder's model (i.e., taking into account both the origin and destination 
blueprint). 
THE DISRUPTIVE NATURE OF TURNOVER 
Ecological perspectives imply that the turnover occasioned by altering 
the premises on which an organization was built should be disruptive. If 
this disruption reflects changes in skills, values, working relationships, 
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and routines associated with a change in the organizational blueprint, 
there is a clear implication for the observed pattern of turnover: 
HYPOTHESIS 2.-The turnover associated with change in an organi- 
zation's employment model is concentrated disproportionately among 
high-tenure employees. 
Note that there is a plausible alternative hypothesis.8 A distinctive and 
coherent blueprint helps organizations create and sustain a reputation in 
the labor market (Baron and Kreps 1999, chap. 3). Employees who con- 
sider joining a firm that has a history of espousing a particular model are 
likely to have a good sense of what they will encounter. If that model 
subsequently changes, however, it presumably takes some time before this 
change gets recognized widely within the labor market, especially if the 
new model lacks consistency and distinctiveness. Hence, employees who 
join a firm following a change in its model might be more likely to be 
mismatched to the organization and therefore to depart promptly. Ac- 
cording to this argument, changing the model prompts higher turnover 
among recently hired personnel who come to conclude that they do not 
fit the organization. If this story has merit, then we would expect that 
turnover in firms that have changed their employment models gets con- 
centrated among a mismatched new guard, rather than among a disen- 
chanted old guard. 
Another implication of the ecological perspective is that employee turn- 
over should adversely affect organizational performance (at least in the 
short run), particularly in young, knowledge-intensive, technology com- 
panies. To be sure, turnover can have beneficial organizational conse- 
quences, including enhanced innovation and adaptability (Pfeffer 1983). 
And numerous observers of Silicon Valley (e.g., Saxenian 1994) have em- 
phasized the beneficial effects of abundant labor mobility in fostering 
innovation and entrepreneurial opportunity. But the alleged benefits of 
turnover usually pertain to the industry or regional level, rather than to 
individual firms. Moreover, the assertion that turnover on balance proves 
beneficial seems somewhat at odds with the lengths to which many Silicon 
Valley start-up firms go in trying to bind employees (e.g., stock options, 
noncompete agreements, extensive benefits) and the frequency with which 
we heard senior executives in these companies fret about turnover as "a 
problem." Accordingly, we also predict that: 
HYPOTHESIS 3.-Employee turnover has a negative effect on organi- 
zational performance. 
8 We are indebted to Craig Olson for stimulating our thinking on this point. 
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OTHER DETERMINANTS OF TURNOVER 
Other factors must be controlled in assessing the net effect of change in 
organizational blueprints on turnover. In particular, CEO succession 
prompts change in start-up companies. Organizational researchers have 
demonstrated that changes in top management regimes can have powerful 
effects on employee turnover (Friedman and Saul 1991; Kesner and Dalton 
1994; Virany, Tushman, and Romanelli 1992), although past studies have 
focused almost exclusively on turnover among top management teams 
within large corporations. CEO succession likely has broader effects on 
employee turnover within the companies that we examine, in which the 
CEO (and particularly the initial founder-CEO) typically is the architect 
of strategy, the chief spokesperson of the organization's culture, and often 
the catalyst for recruiting key scientific, technical, marketing, and sales 
personnel into the venture in the first place. Hence, the departure of the 
organization's leader likely disrupts goals, values, routines, social rela- 
tionships, and implicit contracts regarding the nature of employment. Not 
surprisingly, organizational models change more frequently among SPEC 
companies that have changed CEOs,9 so it is important to ensure that 
any observed effects of model change do not simply reflect CEO change. 
Although these relatively small, young, high-technology companies 
might be more dependent on their founders and leaders than other types 
of organizations, there are ways in which founders can institutionalize 
their conception of the organization's employment model so that it per- 
sists, even after they depart. In particular, we expect that the longer an 
organization's initial leadership regime has been in place, the lower the 
subsequent rate of turnover. This prediction is relatively straightforward 
for companies still led by the initial regime: the longer the regime has 
been in place, the more likely it is to have institutionalized a distinctive 
organizational blueprint and screened out employees who do not fit that 
blueprint. But the duration of the initial regime might influence turnover 
even after that regime has ended. This is because longer-lived founding 
regimes will have been better able to establish and institutionalize a co- 
herent organizational model and supporting culture that enables the en- 
terprise to attract and retain employees who suit that setting.?1 
Our analyses hold constant the cumulative number of CEOs a firm has 
9 Among firms in which a founder was still CEO, 64.3% were coded as not having 
changed on any of the three dimensions of the employment blueprint; among firms 
whose CEO in 1994-95 was not a founder, the corresponding figure was 23.6%. 
O1 In supplementary analyses, we examined whether any effects of CEO succession on 
turnover depend on the tenure of the outgoing CEO and/or characteristics of the 
incoming CEO, such as whether he/she was promoted from within and, if so, was a 




had at a given point in time. One might imagine that leadership changes 
have cumulative disruptive effects, so that turnover increases with the 
number of CEOs an organization has had over a given interval of time, 
controlling for when the last succession event occurred. Alternatively, 
organizations might become habituated to executive succession, so that 
the first regime change produces considerably more disruption than do 
subsequent ones.1' Given these competing predictions, we do not offer a 
specific directional hypothesis. 
We control for two key milestone events: procuring venture capital and 
making an initial public offering (IPO) of stock. These events might have 
opposing effects on employee turnover, insofar as they generally involve 
an infusion of resources into the organization while also bringing about 
significant changes in organizational arrangements, routines, and (in many 
cases) leadership. In supplementary analyses, we also include controls for 
industry, occupational composition, and the gender mix in the firm's first 
year of operations to capture variations in the mix of jobs and workers 
across SPEC companies. 
Organizational size, growth, and age also may influence labor force 
turnover. Turnover is likely to be higher in rapidly growing firms for 
various reasons: (1) rapid growth often strains an organization and its 
members; (2) organizations that must scale up their workforce rapidly are 
more likely to make hiring errors, resulting in short-lived appointments 
that are reflected in high turnover; and (3) if organizational growth is 
correlated with economic growth in Silicon Valley generally (e.g., semi- 
conductor firms are expanding because the cyclical semiconductor in- 
dustry has rebounded), firms might face more labor market competition 
during periods of rapid growth. 
As organizations mature, they systematize employment relations and 
presumably become better informed about the needs and desires of their 
employees. Consequently, it seems reasonable to expect that turnover rates 
will decline with organizational age. Furthermore, older firms seem less 
likely going forward to face the need for major changes in employment 
relationships and employment levels (of the sort that would produce high 
turnover) than firms that are still in their infancy. Nonetheless, we predict 
that turnover actually increases with organizational age in our sample. 
First, growing routinization and bureaucratization as firms age might 
1 The same negative relationship between cumulative number of CEOs and turnover 
could obtain if early generations of leaders confront more fundamental sources of 
uncertainty that could influence strategy or if the actions of early leaders constrain 
the options of subsequent leaders. For instance, it seems easier to imagine the first 
CEO of a firm needing to completely reformulate the firm's strategy or shrink the 
firm's workforce by 50% than it is to envision the fifth CEO of a firm facing those 
same challenges. 
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impede adaptation to rapidly changing environments (as suggested by 
stories of senescence and obsolescence-see Hannan 1998) and encourage 
employees to migrate to firms that appear better suited to current con- 
ditions. Second, the relevant technical labor force has a renowned antip- 
athy to rigid bureaucracy. Moreover, it is widely believed among Silicon 
Valley's labor force that superior financial rewards and technical chal- 
lenges come from getting in on the ground floor of a new enterprise, 
suggesting that employees might become more likely to depart as their 
firm ages. 
DATA, MEASURES, AND METHODS 
Data 
We sent a survey to the executive designated by the CEO as having 
oversight of HR (sometimes, the CEO himself or herself). The survey 
asked the respondent to provide the firm's annual turnover rate for 1991, 
1992, 1993, and 1994. (For firms that were visited in summer or fall of 
1994, the survey asked about turnover annualized for the first six months 
of 1994, rather than the entire year.) A few firms visited in 1995 provided 
turnover data for the first half of 1995. The survey also requested infor- 
mation on various facets of the company's HR system and attributes of 
its workforce, including the current tenure distribution and occupational 
and gender composition at the end of the first year of operations and at 
the time of the survey. Of the 173 firms in the study, 101 (59%) returned 
surveys with usable turnover data. We found no evidence of bias asso- 
ciated with the pattern of missing data resulting from some firms not 
returning the HR survey (Baron et al. 1999b, appendix). 
Because some independent variables vary over time, we constructed 
multiple spells for each firm corresponding to the reporting periods for 
which it provided turnover information (calendar years, except for in- 
stances in which firms reported turnover for the first half of the year in 
which they were interviewed). We use pooled cross-section time-series 
techniques to analyze the data (see below). The data set we analyze con- 
tains 327 spells for the 101 firms that provided usable turnover data on 
the HR survey. Of the 101 companies, 8 provided usable information for 
one turnover spell, 18 for two spells, 17 for three spells, and 58 for four 
spells. 
Measures 
Our dependent variable is the square root of the firm's annual turnover 
rate. We use the square root transformation to normalize what is otherwise 
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a skewed distribution (for a variable that can take on zero values) and 
because we suspect that most factors that increase turnover (e.g., age, 
size) do so at a diminishing rate.12 
We measure leadership change with an indicator variable denoting 
whether a CEO was appointed or left the firm during the spell.13 We also 
include a measure of the firm's cumulative number of CEOs as of the 
start of a spell.14 We measure the tenure of the firm's first leadership 
regime as the tenure of the company's first CEO in the firm, as of the 
start of the spell.'1 (This is a time-varying covariate because it increments 
in value over time for firms that have only had one CEO.) By definition, 
this measure is missing for firms that had yet to designate a CEO as of 
the start of a spell. (Some Silicon Valley start-ups do not designate a CEO 
12 The HR survey requested information on the "annual turnover rate" for specific 
calendar years. (It was not feasible to gather data on turnover rates by occupation 
within these companies.) We were concerned that respondents might have varied in 
how they defined this rate. We followed up by telephone with a sample of respondents, 
asking how they had defined the turnover rate in filling out the survey. Most respon- 
dents apparently defined turnover as the fraction of employees present at the beginning 
of the period who departed by the end of the period, and a number told us that this 
is how turnover is generally construed by Silicon Valley companies. Variations in how 
respondents defined turnover should add noise to the data, reducing the likelihood of 
uncovering significant statistical relationships. Moreover, in supplementary analyses, 
we estimated the effects of time-varying covariates on turnover in fixed-effects spec- 
ifications that control for stable characteristics of each firm (including how it defined 
turnover). The results were largely unchanged, further suggesting that our findings 
are unlikely to reflect differences in how respondents defined the annual turnover rate. 
13 Data on executive succession were obtained from a variety of sources, including 
interviews with firm informants, business press articles, annual reports, other public 
documents (e.g., 10K filings), and company web sites. When our data sources indicated 
that one chief executive departed in a given month and another person began in that 
role during the following month, we treated this as if there had been no interruption 
between the two. Due to imprecision in dating the exact founding date of each company, 
we treated a CEO as having served since the inception of the firm if, according to our 
data sources, his/her tenure as CEO commenced within three months of the company's 
founding. (Otherwise, the data record for that company would indicate that it did not 
have a CEO at the beginning of the spell in question.) In the same vein, because we 
could not always time venture capital financings or transitions to public status precisely, 
we treated a company as having had venture capital or being a publicly traded entity 
as of the start of a given spell if our records indicated that it had received venture 
capital or went public by the end of the first month within that spell. 
14 The key contrast in the data was between firms being led by their first CEO vs. a 
subsequent CEO; accordingly, we dichotomized this measure. 
"5 Notice that the measure captures how long the first CEO had been in the firm, not 
how long he or she had been CEO. This reflects our belief that it is whether the first 
CEO was part of the founding team and how much of the firm's history he or she 
witnessed that affects the ability to institutionalize an organizational blueprint that 
employees will perceive as legitimate, even if the first CEO was not appointed to the 
top job until some time after joining the company. 
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until this is required by investors, the exigencies of going public, and the 
like. This was the case for about 2.5% of the firm-spells in our sample). 
Consequently, in supplementary analyses, we also created an alternative 
measure of the duration of the firm's first leadership regime: first-leader 
tenure within the firm as of the start of a spell, for firms that have had 
a CEO; or the organization's age at the start of the spell, if the firm had 
not yet appointed a CEO. We reasoned that the first leadership regime 
for firms without a CEO involves some sort of shared power arrangement, 
in place since the firm's inception. The findings were unchanged when 
we utilized this alternative measure (results available upon request). To 
simplify the exposition, we report results only from analyses of spells for 
firms that had had one or more CEOs as of the start of the spell. This 
has the effect of reducing slightly the number of available cases, thereby 
raising our burden in detecting significant effects. 
We represent founders' organizational models with binary variables 
corresponding to the typology in table 1. Unless otherwise noted, near- 
model types (i.e., firms that differed along only one of the three dimensions 
from one and only one of the five basic types) are grouped with their 
corresponding types. This potentially mutes some of the contrasts among 
model categories, but it also increases the number of cases in several 
categories, thereby providing more statistical power for detecting system- 
atic differences. We measure the magnitude of change in the organiza- 
tional model by the number of dimensions (0-3) that changed between 
the founder's blueprint and the blueprint coded from the responses of the 
(then-current) CEO. We also report more fine-grained analyses that allow 
the impact of stability or change in a firm's model to vary as a function 
of which particular model it started with and/or migrated to. 
We control for how long (in years) the firm had received venture capital 
financing and/or been publicly traded, as of the start of each spell. We 
transform both variables by taking the square root, because we suspect 
that the effect of getting venture capital and/or going public on turnover 
declines sharply with duration, with the major effect capturing the dif- 
ference between firms that had versus had not experienced these events. 
We capture organizational growth by controlling for employment size 
(in the square root metric) at the end of the year preceding each spell and 
at the end of the firm's first year of operations.16 Organizational age equals 
years since founding, as of the start of each spell. Based on information 
16 The former measure was obtained from secondary sources (corporate directories, 
etc.), interpolated between intervals as necessary. Employment at the end of the first 
year of operations was measured based on the HR survey provided by the company. 
(For firms that did not provide an HR survey, this variable was imputed statistically 
from the secondary-source data and other variables related to employment size.) 
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provided by founders concerning the timing of various events, we defined 
the founding date to be the earliest of three events: legal incorporation, 
hiring the first employee, and start of "normal business operations." In 
supplementary analyses, we also included controls for time (a linear time 
trend or dummy variables corresponding to the calendar year to which 
each spell corresponded), but these controls were insignificant and did 
not alter the pattern of results. 
Finally, we represent industry with two dummy variables, one denoting 
firms engaged in manufacturing and the other denoting firms engaged in 
research; the omitted category represents firms in computer hardware or 
software, telecommunications and networking, semiconductors, or med- 
ical devices and biotechnology. (Other industry contrasts were not sig- 
nificant.) In various supplementary analyses, we also controlled for the 
distribution of the firm's employees in the first year across various broad 
occupational categories (e.g., scientific and engineering; administrative 
and managerial; clerical; sales) and the proportion of the work force that 
was female. These did not alter the basic pattern of effects of change in 
organizational model on turnover; accordingly, their effects are not re- 
ported here (results available on request). 
Estimation 
Our data structure is a pooled cross section and time series. The data are 
unbalanced: the number of observations varies among firms. Recent or- 
ganizational research typically models such data with fixed-effect esti- 
mators, which analyze only the within-firm over-time variation. This 
choice is unappealing in this context because some key independent var- 
iables (e.g., founders' organizational blueprints and whether the blueprint 
changed) do not vary over time. Instead, we use robust estimators that 
analyze both between-firm and within-firm variation. Specifically, we 
use the method of generalized estimating equations (GEE) developed by 
Liang and Zeger (1986; also see Zeger and Liang 1986). This approach 
generalizes quasi-likelihood estimation to the panel context. Like quasi- 
likelihood, GEE requires specification of only the first and second mo- 
ments of the distribution of the outcome, rather than the full distribution 
as is required for maximum likelihood. Under mild regularity conditions, 
GEE estimators are consistent and asymptotically normal. 
The setup we estimate is the following. The outcome is a firm's turnover 
rate (square root) in a given year. For the ith firm, we have ni observations, 
Yi (Yil, Yi2, **. Yini), 
and the vector of outcomes can be written as 
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y = (Yi, Y2, -- , ym) - 
The covariates vary over firms and (in some cases) over time for given 
firms: 
X = (xll, x1, ... , XK1 ... ,XKI)I 
Xki = (Xkil, Xki2, ... Xkini) 
If we represent the disturbances as 
Ui = (Uil,Ui2, ... ,Uini) 
then we can write the structural model to be estimated as 
y = Xb + u. 
We expect that the disturbance process will exhibit autocorrelation of 
the usual panel type: observations for the same firm will tend to be cor- 
related due to permanent and gradually changing, unobserved firm prop- 
erties. However, we assume that observations are uncorrelated for dif- 
ferent firms. In particular, we assume that the covariance matrix of 
disturbances has the following form: 
-A, 0 . . 0 
0 A, 0 . 0 
E(uu') 0 . . 
. . . O 
0 . 0 A,_ 
where 4is a scale parameter, 
Ai = iaR, 
and the matrix R satisfies the properties of a correlation matrix. GEE 
requires a specification of a working correlation matrix. The implemen- 
tation we used-the XTGEE routine within version 6.0 of STATA 
(StataCorp 1999)-allows a menu of choices for the working correlation 
matrix. We experimented with several, including the classic exchangeable 
correlation structure from the standard random-effects setup, as well as 
first- and second-order serial autocorrelation. We found that models fit 
best when we used a completely unstructured working correlation matrix, 
in which each off-diagonal entry is unconstrained and estimated from the 




R = r13 r23 1 
r14 r24 r34 1 
r15 r25 r35 r45 1 
where the rows and columns correspond to the calendar years represented 
in our data set (1991-95). 
We conjectured that autocorrelation would decline over time and across 
waves of panels, because the hazard of major shocks that would coun- 
teract autocorrelation in the determinants of turnover is likely to increase 
as firms grow older. Consistent with our conjecture, autocorrelation did 
decline with the temporal distance between spells and across waves of 
panels (e.g., there was stronger autocorrelation between 1991 and 1992 
observations than between the 1991 and 1993 panels or between the 1992 
and 1993 panels), and models permitting this error structure fit consid- 
erably better than models that impose a more constrained error structure. 
We report robust standard errors, using the so-called sandwich estimators 
developed by Huber (1967) and White (1982). 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Table 2 summarizes the pattern of transitions from founder to CEO mod- 
els. Among firms that we classified as having a particular model at found- 
ing, the table reports the fraction that we classified as having each type 
of organizational model in 1994-95, based on our interviews with CEOs. 
Row (1) in the table reports results based on classifying the founder's 
model as aberrant unless it corresponded perfectly to one of the five basic 
model types in table 1. Row (2) groups near-model-type firms (i.e., those 
that differed in only one dimension from only one of the five basic types) 
with their corresponding basic type category. The parenthesized results 
in table 2 pertain to the entire sample of SPEC firms for which we had 
the requisite information to code the founder's and CEO's organizational 
model, whereas the results without parentheses are for the subset of firms 
providing valid data on employee turnover (and thus used in our analyses). 
Table 2 provides descriptive background, but it is substantively infor- 
mative in several respects. The diagonal entries in table 2 reveal that the 
commitment and bureaucratic models-which in many respects represent 
polar extremes-are the most persistent over time (i.e., have the smallest 
fraction of firms that transitioned to a different model). And, despite the 
relatively frequent shifts in the sample toward bureaucracy, no firms 
founded along commitment model lines made that transition. Table 2 also 
portrays the engineering model as relatively compatible with other or- 
981 
TABLE 2 
STABILITY AND CHANGE IN ORGANIZATIONAL MODELS 
CEO MODEL 
FOUNDER MODEL Aberrant Autocracy Commitment Star Engineering Bureaucracy N FIRMS 
Aberrant: 
1 ................ 60.5 (64.6) 
2 ................ 50.0 (54.2) 
Autocracy: 
2.6 (1.5) 2.6 (4.6) 
3.3 (2.1) 3.3 (4.2) 
2.6 (1.5) 13.2 (13.8) 18.4 (13.8) 38 (65) 
.0 (.0) 16.7 (18.8) 26.7 (20.8) 30 (48) 
................ 50.0 (50.0) 50.0 (50.0) .0 (.0) .0 (.0) .0 (.0) 
2 ................ 33.3 (40.0) 33.3 (40.0) 16.7 (10.0) .0 (.0) .0 (.0) 
Commitment: 
1................ 28.6 (36.4) .0 (.0) 57.1 (54.5) .0 (.0) 14.3 (9.1) 
2 ................ 16.7 (9.5) 8.3 (9.5) 58.3 (71.4) 8.3 (4.8) 8.3 (4.8) 
Star: 
1 ................ 37.5 (38.5) 
2 ................ 33.3 (33.3) 
Engineering: 
1 ................ 25.0 (22.0) 
2 ................ 25.0 (20.0) 
Bureaucracy: 
1 ................ 20.0 (12.5) 





.0 (.0) 7 (11) 
.0 (.0) 12 (21) 
.0 (.0) .0 (.0) 37.5 (46.2) 12.5 (7.7) 12.5 (7.7) 
.0 (.0) .0 (.0) 44.4 (53.3) 11.1 (6.7) 11.1 (6.7) 
8 (13) 
9 (15) 
.0 (2.0) .0 (.0) .0 (.0) 43.8 (52.0) 31.3 (24.0) 32 (50) 
.0 (2.0) .0 (2.0) .0 (.0) 43.8 (52.0) 31.3 (24.0) 32 (50) 
.0 (.0) .0 (.0) 
.0 (.0) 20.0 (11.1) 
.0 (.0) 20.0 (25.0) 60.0 (62.5) 




1 ................ 41.5 (43.1) 3.2 (3.3) 5.3 (5.9) 4.3 (4.6) 23.4 (25.5) 22.3 (17.6) 94 (153) 
2 ................ 31.9 (30.7) 4.3 (5.2) 10.6 (13.1) 5.3 (5.9) 23.4 (25.5) 24.5 (19.6) 94 (153) 
NOTE.-Table shows row percentages for transition matrix from founder's to CEO's model. Row 1 results classify firms as "aberrant" that do not correspond 
to one of the five basic model types; row 2 results group "near-model-type" firms (see text for explanation) into the corresponding basic-type category. Results 
shown in parentheses are for all SPEC firms; other results are for the subset of firms providing valid data on employee turnover. Chi-square tests for row 1 of 
each pair: X2 = 113.4; df = 25; P<.001 (X2 = 195.0; df = 25; P<.001); for row 2, x2 = 99.0; df = 25; P<.001 (X2 = 211.8; df= 25; P<.001). 
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ganizational models: a relatively high fraction of firms founded along 
engineering model lines transitioned to a bureaucratic model (and vice 
versa), and the engineering model seems to be a destination that is reached 
with some frequency by firms irrespective of their founding model (except 
for firms founded as autocracies). As we shall see below (table 5), the 
transitions that occur with relatively low (high) frequency in table 2 are 
generally the transitions that occasion relatively more (less) employee turn- 
over. In other words, firms seem less likely to have made the most "turn- 
over-prone" transitions than to undertake the less turnover-prone ones. 
This gives us some confidence that the model types capture distinct or- 
ganizational blueprints and suggests that the architects and leaders of 
firms are mindful of the disruptive consequences of changing organiza- 
tional blueprints. 
Table 3 reports descriptive statistics for all 327 spells containing valid 
turnover data. The annual turnover rate averages approximately 13%, 
though there is obviously substantial variation. (Though not reported in 
table 3, among the 93 firms with two or more turnover spells, 54.9% of 
the variation in turnover is between firms; for the square root of turnover, 
the corresponding figure is 62.6%.) Note that modest differences in turn- 
over, if sustained over time, can have quite dramatic implications for 
organizations. For instance, according to table 3, firms in the sample were 
on average about 4.5 years old at the start of a spell.17 Consider the 
cumulative effect of being one standard deviation above the sample mean 
on turnover (26% vs. 13%). If annual turnover remained constant at 13% 
for a cohort over time, then after four years, 57% of the original cohort 
would remain; after six years, the fraction is 43%. In a firm experiencing 
26% turnover, just under 30% of the original employees would still be 
there after four years, and only 16% after six years. (The picture does not 
change much if we incorporate more reasonable assumptions about turn- 
over declining with tenure.) Such differences in the representation of the 
old guard seem likely to have significant organizational implications. 
A change in top leadership occurred during 11.6% of the spells. In 
about 2.5% of the spells, firms had not yet appointed a CEO; for nearly 
17 Note that the minimum organizational age reported in table 3 is -0.42%. For a few 
cases (just under 4% of spells), the birth of the organization (based on our criteria for 
defining age-see text) occurred sometime during the spell. To be treated as a valid 
observation and included in our sample, a firm must have existed for more than half 
the year to which the turnover data corresponded, and the company had to have 
provided turnover information for the year in question. This was done to avoid cases 
in which, for instance, a firm might have reported turnover data for 1991 but our 
measure of organizational age indicated that the firm came into existence in November 
or December of 1991, so the firm's turnover report pertained to an extremely short 




Variable Mean Median SD Min Max N spells N firms 
Turnover rate: 
During annual spell ............................. 13.23 
During annual spell (square root) .............. 3.16 
Employment: 
Start of spell (FTEs, square root) .............. 8.39 
End of year 1 (FTEs, square root) ............ 4.77 
Duration of first leadership (years) ............... 3.67 
Duration of first CEO (years) ..................... 3.77 
Change in CEO during spell ...................... .12 
No CEO at start of spell .......................... .02 
2 + CEOs as of start of spell ....................... .25 
Cumulative N of CEOs as of start of spell ...... 1.36 
Duration of VC funding (years, square root) .... 1.15 
Duration of public status (years, square root) ... .23 
Age at start of spell (years) ........................ 4.50 
Founder's model:* 
Commitment ..................................... .13 
Star .........................................11 
Engineering ...................................... .34 
A utocracy ......................................... .07 
H ybrid ............................. ............. .30 














.00 100.00 327 





























.00 1.00 302 
.00 1.00 302 
.00 1.00 302 
.00 1.00 302 
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CEO's vs. founder's model: 
N dimensions changed .......................... .84 1.00 .87 .00 3.00 302 93 
Industry: 
Research ........................................ .02 .00 .00 1.00 327 101 
Manufacturing ................................... .04 .00 .00 1.00 327 101 
Computer hardware/software .................. .44 .00 .00 1.00 327 101 
Telecommunications/networking ............... .20 .00 .00 1.00 327 101 
Medical devices or biotech ..................... .18 .00 .00 1.00 327 101 
Semiconductors .................................. .11 .00 .00 1.00 327 101 
Proportion employees, end of year 1, in: 
Science/engineering roles ........................ .37 .42 .23 .00 .78 263 77 
Sales roles ........................................ .08 .05 .10 .00 .43 259 76 
Clerical roles ..................................... .04 .00 .06 .00 .29 259 76 
Administrative/senior management roles ...... .40 .33 .23 .09 1.00 260 76 
<D Proportion female, end of year 1 ................. .24 .22 .15 .00 .64 265 78 
00 
cIt NOTE.- SDs are not shown for binary variables. 
* 
"Near-type" firms grouped with corresponding "pure type" firms in each category (see text for explanation). 
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a quarter of the spells, the firm had already experienced two or more 
CEOs as of the start of the spell. 
Among founders, the engineering model was the most prevalent (34%). 
We coded roughly 7% of the founders as having an autocratic model, 
13% as commitment, 11% as star, and just under 6% as bureaucratic.18 
Thirty percent of founders gave responses that did not fit into any basic 
model type (or one of the near-types); we coded their blueprints as aberrant 
or nontype. The typical firm in our sample experienced change in its 
organizational model along one dimension, based on our classification of 
the blueprints associated with CEOs at the time of our interviews versus 
the models envisioned by founders. (For 44.1% of the firms and 42.4% 
of the spells, the founder and CEO models were identical on all three 
dimensions.) Not surprisingly, model changes were more frequent and 
extensive in firms that had also changed leadership. Among companies 
with valid employee turnover data, 44% were still led by a founder in 
1994-95; of those, 57% were coded as not having changed the blueprint 
on any dimension and only 12% had changed on two or more dimensions. 
Among companies with a nonfounder CEO by 1994-95, only 23% had 
not changed the model on any of the three dimensions, whereas 40% 
changed on two or more dimensions. 
RESULTS 
Effects of Organizational Model and Change in Model on Turnover 
Table 4 reports results from multivariate analyses predicting the square 
root of turnover for each firm-year spell. In a simple bivariate regression 
(not shown in table 4), the gross effect of blueprint change (number of 
dimensions that differed between the founder's and CEO's blueprints) is 
0.660 (z = 5.084, P < .001). Thus, relative to firms with stable employment 
blueprints, a firm in which the blueprint changed on all three dimensions 
is predicted to have a turnover rate that is (3 x .660)2 = 3.92 points 
higher.19 This strong positive effect persists after controlling for other 
determinants of turnover. Model 1 in table 4, for instance, adds dummy 
variables depicting the founder's blueprint (with bureaucracy as the omit- 
ted category). Unexpectedly, firms founded on a bureaucracy model have 
lower turnover rates than firms founded on different blueprints, and that 
18 These percentages are based on combining "near-type" cases with their model-type 
counterparts. For "basic model type" firms alone, autocracy is 4.3%, commitment is 
6.3%; star is 9.3%; engineering is 33.8%, and bureaucracy is 5.6%. 
19 This bivariate regression (based on 302 observations, 93 firms) has a constant of 




effect persists in model 2, which controls for a variety of organizational 
characteristics. 
Of course, the effects of founders' models might reflect differences 
among the blueprints in their persistence and in the types of transitions 
they will likely experience, which are not captured simply by the number 
of dimensions that changed. As a first means of examining that possibility, 
model 3 adds dummy variables depicting the CEO's blueprint (with bu- 
reaucracy as the omitted category). The main contrast among CEO blue- 
prints is between autocracy, which exhibits the highest turnover rate net 
of other controls, and the commitment model, which displays the lowest. 
Accordingly, model 4 in table 4 presents the same specification with the 
commitment blueprint as the reference category for founder's and CEO's 
organizational model.20 Model 4 reveals that firms whose CEOs' blue- 
prints were autocracy or bureaucracy had significantly higher turnover 
than otherwise comparable companies whose CEOs had a commitment 
model. According to model 3, firms whose CEO had a bureaucratic model 
also display significantly higher turnover than firms whose CEO model 
was classified as star. 
It is important to acknowledge the causal ambiguity involved in relating 
CEO model and change in the model to turnover. Because we cannot 
date when a firm's model changed (if it did), turnover might be the cause, 
not a consequence, of the CEO's present-day model. We return to this 
issue below and present some results that provide reassurance against 
this possibility. 
Models 3 and 4 of table 4 suggest that the effects of stability and change 
in organizational blueprints depend substantially on the specific blue- 
print(s) involved. For instance, relative to a firm that retained a bureau- 
cratic model (the reference category in model 3), a stable autocracy is 
predicted to have experienced a turnover rate that is (0.365 + 
1.459)2 = 3.33 points higher. Or consider two firms whose models changed 
on two dimensions: firm A changed from engineering to commitment; and 
firm B shifted from star to bureaucracy. Relative to firms with a stable 
bureaucracy blueprint (the reference category in model 3), annual turnover 
is predicted to be only 0.90 higher in firm A, compared to 7.00 higher in 
firm B.21 When compared to firms with a stable commitment blueprint 
20 Results for model 1 are comparable when reestimated on the same 271 cases as 
models 2-4 in table 4. 
21 For the star to bureaucracy transition, e.g., the predicted effect in model 3 is the 
main effect of a star founder's model (1.600), plus the main effect of a bureaucracy 
CEO's model (0), plus the effect of changing the model on two dimensions (2 x 




TURNOVER RATES: GEE ESTIMATES OF POOLED CROSS-SECTION, TIME-SERIES VARIATION 
MODEL 1 MODEL 2 MODEL 3 MODEL 4 
VARIABLE b z prob > I z b z prob > I z b z prob > I z I b z prob > I z I 
Employment: 
Start of spell (square 
root) ................... 
End of year 1 (square 
co root) ................... 
oo Duration of first CEO 
(years) ................... 
Change in CEO during 
spell ...................... 
2+ CEOs as of start of 
spell ...................... 
Duration of VC funding 
(years, square root) ..... 
Duration of public status 
(years, square root) ..... 
Age at start of spell 
(years) ................... 
Founder's model: 
Commitment ............ 1.153 2.530 .011 
Star ...................... .887 1.607 .108 
.027 .864 .387 
-.051 -1.347 .178 
-.131 -1.421 .155 
.222 .970 .332 
-.664 -1.886 .059 
.289 1.965 .049 
-.544 -2.475 .013 
.175 2.456 .014 
1.190 2.440 .015 
1.294 2.711 .007 
.035 1.100 .271 
-.036 -.984 .325 
-.106 -1.381 .167 
.376 1.507 .132 
-.410 -1.201 .230 
.135 .968 .333 
-.584 -2.829 .005 
.213 3.715 .000 
1.419 3.470 .001 
1.600 3.094 .002 
.035 1.100 .271 
-.036 -.984 .325 
-.106 -1.381 .167 
.376 1.507 .132 
-.410 -1.201 .230 
.135 .968 .333 
-.584 -2.829 .005 
.213 3.715 .000 
.181 .421 .674 
Engineering ............ 1.071 2.419 .016 
Autocracy . ............ 1.173 1.966 .049 









CEO's vs. founder's 
model: 




Constant ................... 1.698 4.575 .000 
'o 00 
~O 
1.047 2.654 .008 
.905 1.333 .183 
.885 2.126 .034 
1.007 2.888 .004 
.365 .809 .418 
.889 2.271 .023 
-1.104 -2.937 .003 
-.969 -2.153 .031 
-.641 -1.587 .113 
1.459 3.739 .000 
-.646 -1.907 .057 
.644 4.067 .000 .523 3.730 .000 
-.686 -1.547 .122 -.731 -1.773 .076 
-1.169 -3.362 .001 -1.105 -3.356 .001 
1.321 2.911 .004 1.569 3.833 .000 
-.412 -1.097 .272 
-1.054 -2.597 .009 
-.530 -1.866 .062 
-1.419 -3.470 .001 
.135 .282 .778 
.463 1.033 .302 
2.564 5.538 .000 
.458 1.378 .168 
1.104 2.937 .003 
.523 3.730 .000 
-.731 -1.773 .076 
-1.105 -3.356 .001 
1.569 3.833 .000 
N observations ............ 
N firms ..................... 
Wald x2 .................... 
d f ........................... 
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(the reference category in model 4), firm B is predicted to have an annual 
turnover rate that is 5.43 higher, whereas firm A's is only 1.51 higher. 
Changing the Organizational Model: A Closer Look 
The additive specification in table 4 potentially masks interactive effects 
of origins and destinations in determining the disruptive effects of chang- 
ing the organizational blueprint. To differentiate between the process and 
content effects of organizational change, table 5 provides a finer-grained 
portrait of how turnover varies as a function of stability and change in 
founders' employment blueprints. It reports estimates of specifications 
that incorporate the same set of covariates as in model 2 of table 4, but 
we replace the covariates representing founders' blueprints and the num- 
ber of dimensions that changed with a vector of dummy variables rep- 
resenting specific combinations of founder and CEO blueprints. The par- 
ticular combinations of origin and destination states incorporated in table 
5 capture the main contrasts that we thought interesting (how close to 
one of the five basic model types; distance between origin and destination 
model; and so forth) and the main transitions observed in our data. (For 
several transitions of particular substantive interest, the number of cases 
was very small, but we have nonetheless reported the detailed results.) 
The coefficients in table 5 represent predicted differences in turnover 
(square-root metric) between firms that experienced a given transition and 
two different reference categories: stable bureaucracies (the first set of 
coefficients in table 5); or all firms that did not change their employment 
blueprint (the second set of coefficients). Table 6 reports significance tests 
on contrasts between specific coefficients (rows) in table 5, rather than 
contrasts vis-a-vis the reference categories. 
Table 5 suggests two basic conclusions. First, abandoning a basic model 
type was generally associated with higher turnover, in support of hy- 
pothesis la (but see below). Consistent with hypothesis lc, the disruptive 
effect of abandoning a basic model type in favor of an aberrant blueprint 
seems especially large for firms founded along commitment or star lines 
(see comparison in table 6 between rows 7 and 8).22 Second, consistent 
with hypothesis lb, changing to a basic model type was less disruptive 
than moving to an aberrant blueprint. For instance, among firms that 
abandoned the commitment or star model, those migrating to the engi- 
neering model had somewhat lower turnover than those adopting an 
22 Even moving to the engineering model (a model that seems robust and flexible) from 
the commitment or star model seems slightly more disruptive than migrating to the 
engineering blueprint from any other pure model (cf. rows 12 and 13), though table 6 
reveals that the contrast is not significant (P = .15). 
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aberrant blueprint (see comparison in table 6 between rows 7 and 12; 
P = .097, two-tailed).23 
The bureaucracy and autocracy models do not fit this pattern, however. 
Generally, moving to either of them increased turnover, whereas aban- 
doning either of them reduced turnover. Moving from any other basic 
model to bureaucracy increased turnover considerably, though the ap- 
parent dislocation was considerably smaller among firms that migrated 
to bureaucracy from the engineering model (cf. rows 10 and 11), consistent 
with the claimed compatibility between engineering culture and bureau- 
cratic culture. This result illustrates that origins and destinations matter: 
movement to bureaucracy from either the engineering model or an ab- 
errant blueprint produced significantly less turnover than did 
abandonment of another basic model (especially the star type) for bu- 
reaucracy (row 11). Similarly, in one case abandoning a basic model seems 
to have reduced turnover: movement from bureaucracy to engineering 
(row 13). 
These findings suggest that, in at least some cases, the disruptive effects 
associated with altering an organization's employment model are more 
than offset by an increase in the attractiveness of the new model. In short, 
the content of organizational changes affects how disruptive they are. 
Dismantling the commitment and star models apparently was most de- 
stabilizing, whereas any disruptive effects associated with dismantling 
bureaucracy seem to have been more than offset by favorable responses 
to the change, resulting in lower turnover. Conversely, in shifts to bu- 
reaucracy or autocracy, the virtues of a clear and consistent model as a 
destination state were offset considerably by employees' apparent strong 
dislike for these particular models. 
Another result in table 5 suggests that the basic model types represent 
relatively desirable origin and destination states, in terms of minimizing 
labor turnover: companies that replaced one aberrant or nontype blueprint 
with another experienced especially high turnover (row 9). Only firms that 
retained or adopted autocracy or that migrated to bureaucracy from an- 
other basic model other than engineering had higher predicted turnover 
levels (cf. rows 14, 15, 15a, and 15b). 
In other words, if a founder adopted an aberrant HR model, then 
changing to another aberrant model made the organization especially 
vulnerable to turnover. The contrasts among these effects are not highly 
significant, however, for several reasons. First, the transition from an 
23 All firms that migrated to bureaucracy from a model type other than engineering 
were founded along star-model lines (see row 11). This transition was characterized 
by particularly high turnover, because abandoning the star model and migrating to 
bureaucracy both seem to be destabilizing for technology companies. 
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EFFECTS ON TURNOVER OF STABILITY AND CHANGE IN FOUNDER'S EMPLOYMENT MODELS 
REFERENCE CATEGORY 
Stable Bureaucracy All Stable Firms 
Row (FOUNDER'S MODEL) => (CEO'S MODEL) N SPELLS N FIRMS Coefficient z prob > z | Coefficient z prob > | z I 
1 ...... Stable autocracy 
2 ...... Stable commitment 
3 ...... Stable star 
4 ...... Stable engineering 
5 ...... Stable near-type model* 
6 ...... Stable aberrant (nontype) model 
7 ...... (Commitment or star) = aberrant 
8 ...... (Basic model other than commitment or 
star) = aberrant 
9 ...... (Aberrant or near-type) = (different aber- 
rant or near-type) 
10 .... (Engineering or aberrant) =* bureaucracy 
11 .... (Basic model other than engineering) 
bureaucracy* 
4 2 2.151 2.571 .010 
11 4 .630 .826 .409 
10 3 1.053 2.108 .035 
36 10 .463 .826 .409 
12 3 .232 .398 .691 
27 9 -.202 -.444 .657 
14 5 2.061 3.828 .000 
33 10 .943 1.501 .133 
30 8 2.077 3.094 .002 
50 16 1.345 2.971 .003 
3 2.551 5.260 .000 
1.196 2.903 .004 
.302 .632 .527 
1.198 2.114 .034 
.651 1.740 .082 
1.739 4.516 .000 
12 .... (Commitment or star) = (different basic 
model other than bureaucracy)t 
13 .... (Basic model other than commitment or 
star) = (different basic model other than 
bureaucracy)t? 
14 .... (Aberrant or near-type) = (commitment or 
star) 
15 .... (Aberrant or near-type) = (basic model 
other than commitment or star) 
15a ... (Aberrant or near-type) = engineering 
15b ... (Aberrant or near-type) > autocracy 
3 2 .464 .486 .627 
3 1 -.788 -2.155 .031 
8 2 .944 1.442 .149 
18 6 1.550 2.460 .014 
14 5 1.160 1.879 .060 
4 1 3.004 5.902 .000 
-.304 -.354 .723 
-1.480 -5.868 .000 
.286 .478 .632 
.975 1.910 .056 
.694 1.244 .214 
2.178 5.037 .000 
NOTE. -Predicted effects on turnover (square root) from model controlling for same covariates as in model 2 of table 4. Results pertaining to rows 15a and 15b 
are based on a supplementary specification replacing transition in row 15 with transitions shown in rows 15a and 15b; all other results are from a specification 
including the contrasts in rows 1-15. 
* All cases of stable near-type models are near-commitment firms. 
* All transitions originated from star model 
t All transitions involve move to engineering model 
? All transitions originated from bureaucratic model 
x0 (ao 
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TABLE 6 
ADDITIONAL CONTRASTS AMONG COEFFICIENTS IN TABLE 5 
Row Contrasts Coefficient z prob > z | 
7 versus (2, 3) ....... 1.244 2.161 .031 
7 versus 8 ............ 1.118 1.930 .054 
7 versus 12 .......... 1.598 1.659 .097 
9 versus (5, 6) ....... 2.183 3.888 .000 
9 versus 8 ............ 1.134 1.771 .077 
9 versus 14 .......... 1.134 1.583 .114 
9 versus 15 ...........528 .766 .444 
9 versus 15a ..........918 1.279 .201 
9 versus 15b ......... -.925 -1.698 .090 
10 versus (4, 5, 6) ... 1.114 2.577 .010 
10 versus 11 ......... -1.205 -2.774 .006 
10 versus 13 ......... 2.134 6.514 .000 
12 versus 13 ......... 1.252 1.433 .152 
14 versus (5, 6) ...... 1.031 1.847 .065 
14 versus 15 ......... -.606 -.909 .363 
14 versus 15b ....... -2.073 -3.495 .000 
15a versus 15b ...... -1.843 -2.718 .007 
15 versus (5, 6) ...... 1.629 3.432 .001 
aberrant blueprint to one of the five basic models compounds two op- 
posing effects-the disruptive effects of altering the employment model, 
and the (presumably) beneficial effect of adopting a consistent model. 
Second, the benefit associated with shifting to a basic model type depends 
on the underlying attractiveness of that model. For instance, relative to 
firms that retained an aberrant blueprint, companies that shifted to one 
of the basic types generally experienced higher turnover, consistent with 
the notion that changing the premises governing employment relations 
disrupts an organization's equilibrium. 
The magnitude of the effect of change depends significantly on the 
destination (the new blueprint). Consider several examples. For transitions 
to the commitment or star blueprint from an aberrant model (which were 
few in number), predicted turnover was only modestly higher (1.031) than 
among firms that stayed with a particular aberrant blueprint (z = 
1.847; P = .065). Moving to the engineering model from a nontype blue- 
print occasioned somewhat higher turnover, significantly more than 
among firms that retained a particular aberrant blueprint (if row 15a in 
table 5 is contrasted against rows 5 and 6, b = 1.300; z = 2.704; P = 
.007; supplementary analyses not shown in table 6). The transition from 
an aberrant model to bureaucracy also produced significantly higher turn- 
over than occurred among companies that retained their founder's ab- 
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errant blueprint.24 Migrating from an aberrant form to autocracy, although 
quite rare, seems to have been even more disruptive; firms making this 
transition experienced significantly higher turnover than companies that 
retained an aberrant blueprint (b = 3.193; z = 6.389; P < .001; supple- 
mentary analyses not reported in table 6), and even somewhat higher than 
in companies that cycled from one aberrant model to another (see contrast 
between rows 9 and 15b in table 6). 
In short, model consistency and cultural resonance are not virtues in- 
dependent of the model's content. Rather, the effect of abandoning or 
moving to one of the five basic models seems to depend quite a bit on 
the specific model. The commitment and star models appear to be par- 
ticularly risky to dismantle and less contentious to adopt. In contrast, 
moving from bureaucracy and autocracy entails little disruption, whereas 
moving toward these models seems especially unsettling. 
The fine-grained analyses in tables 5 and 6 cast light on the differences 
in turnover rates as a function of founder's employment model that were 
reported in table 4. Among firms that retained their original employment 
blueprints, the only model types with significantly higher turnover than 
bureaucracy were autocracy and star. According to table 5, autoc- 
racy-whether adopted at the firm's inception or subsequently (cf. rows 
1 and 15b)-fosters high levels of employee turnover. This is hardly sur- 
prising, given the considerable education, experience, and professionalism 
among Silicon Valley's labor force; the intense competition among em- 
ployers for key personnel; and employees' high expectations for autonomy 
and self-actualization at work. The star model is widely perceived in 
Silicon Valley as turnover-prone, due to perceived inequities it can foster, 
the high mobility of scientific and technical stars to whom the model is 
targeted, and the tendency of star-oriented firms to rely more on stock 
options (which either stay underwater or else vest and are exercised, in 
either case making the firm vulnerable to turnover). 
Other differences in turnover rates as a function of the founder's model 
are not significant (in table 5) after controlling for the specific transitions 
that firms experienced. Although turnover appeared (in table 4) to be 
lower in firms founded along bureaucratic lines than in companies 
founded on commitment, engineering, or hybrid models, tables 5 and 6 
reveal that this is simply because the latter firms were more likely to 
change their employment models-which on its own is destabilizing-and 
24 In supplementary analyses, we subdivided row 10 into firms that transitioned to 
bureaucracy from the engineering model versus from an aberrant (nontype) blueprint. 
Turnover within the latter group was significantly higher than among firms with a 
stable near-type or nontype blueprint (b = 1.735; z = 2.899; P = .004). 
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to make the kinds of changes that foster higher turnover (i.e., toward 
bureaucracy, autocracy, or an aberrant blueprint). 
Yet table 5 indicates that no other employment model, retained over 
time, displays significantly lower turnover than bureaucracy. We find this 
result somewhat surprising in light of the apparent low regard with which 
Silicon Valley employees view bureaucracy, as evidenced by the reductions 
(increases) in turnover that seem to accompany firms' abandoning (em- 
bracing) a bureaucratic model (see rows 10, 11 and 13 in table 5). We 
speculate that firms founded along bureaucratic lines might have antic- 
ipated long-term growth and hired employees better prepared to handle 
the transition to a more mature organization, whereas that transition 
requires more "churning" of personnel in firms built on other models.25 
(This is especially plausible to the extent that founders who embraced a 
bureaucratic model had prior exposure to larger, well-established tech- 
nology companies.) Some evidence consistent with this speculation comes 
from the summary notes provided by a member of our research team 
after interviewing a founder of one of the firms we coded as adhering to 
a stable bureaucratic model. That founder had previously worked in one 
of Silicon Valley's largest and most prominent companies: 
During her tenure, Z (one of the founders) has put in place systems and 
controls that would be appropriate for a far larger company. Z has prepared 
for the growth (little so far) that the company anticipates and she points 
out that some of the company's systems have yet to be fully utilized. The 
firm under Z seems to be employee friendly. Z has a reputation for great 
relations with her employees-or her "people," as she's been known to call 
them-a fact that is borne out in the firm's low turnover. She mentioned 
two former employers (large, well-established technology companies) as in- 
fluences with regard to organizational design .... CEO Z says she is the 
person most responsible for HR at the company. HR at the firm is part of 
strategic planning. When the company reaches 50 employees . . . a full- 
time HR specialist will be hired. Indeed, Z knew exactly where in her file 
cabinet to find the company's employee handbook, developed in the com- 
pany's first year as Z's first task as CEO. ... In addition to the employee 
handbook, she also instituted in the first year written performance evalu- 
ations, nondisclosure agreements (NDAs), and instituted regular company- 
wide meetings. (ID #141) 
Another company that we classified as a stable bureaucracy seems to 
fit a similar pattern-planning in advance for rapid growth by a founder 
25 Precisely because bureaucracies are rather atypical within Silicon Valley, it is also 
possible that firms founded along such lines transmit clearer and more accurate pre- 
employment expectations for individuals joining the firm, relative to organizations 
built on other models (particularly the commitment, star, and autocracy models), re- 
sulting in higher posthiring attrition in the latter. 
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with prior work experience in large, well-established technology com- 
panies. This firm's founder-CEO, a Ph.D. scientist who had worked pre- 
viously in several large electronics, semiconductor, and defense companies, 
anticipated the explosive growth in portable computers and in "smart 
devices" (digital cameras, mobile phones, personal digital assistants) and 
hoped to compete against Intel and Advanced Micro Devices in producing 
flash memory storage devices. He sought to capture early mover advan- 
tage by developing technology, key supplier and customer partnerships, 
and organizational capability in advance of a market that was only just 
emerging when the company was launched: 
Founder: The catalyst for starting the company was that I believed that 
there was going to be a need in the marketplace for the kind of products 
that I had in mind several years after we were going to start a company. 
... I felt I had a solution to a problem that was not yet evident as a problem. 
Interviewer: (Did you have) a model or a blueprint for organizing the com- 
pany at the beginning, whether from your past experience or from other 
companies that you admired? 
Founder: Yeah, it was basically, the first five years we would be a functional 
organization, we would have VP's for the various functions, no separate 
divisions .. ., and have very good executive staff, hire a good CFO, a good 
VP of engineering, VP of technology, VP of operations, traditional structure. 
And I did not expect that (to) change in the first five years. I did not look 
beyond the first five years. (ID #19)26 
In sum, differences in turnover across founder models for the most part 
reflect differences in the vulnerabilities of the particular models to sub- 
sequent change and the dislocating effects of such changes. More broadly, 
the results in tables 5 and 6 provide some indirect validation of our 
typology of employment models. For instance, the high turnover char- 
acteristic of firms that moved between aberrant blueprints suggests that 
consistency of the organization's employment model does indeed reduce 
turnover. Moreover, transitions among particular origin and destination 
models vary in sensible and predictable ways in affecting turnover (e.g., 
the dislocating effects of abandoning the commitment or star model and 
of migrating toward bureaucracy or autocracy). Altering the employment 
blueprint generally destabilizes organizations, especially when the blue- 
print is relatively coherent. However, the content of the changes can 
attenuate or exacerbate the process effect (the tendency for changing the 
employment model to foster turnover). 
26 Interestingly, when asked whether he had any specific company in mind as an 
organizational model, the founder mentioned Intel, the largest firm in the industry. 
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OTHER DETERMINANTS OF TURNOVER RATES 
We briefly summarize the effects of other variables on firms' turnover 
rates in table 4. We find no net effect of change in CEO during a spell 
on turnover. Interestingly, the gross effect (not shown in table 4) is sizable 
and statistically significant (b = 0.687; z = 2.539; P = 0.011), but it be- 
comes insignificant once we control for change in the founder's organi- 
zational model.27 In other words, executive succession is associated with 
turnover primarily because it is associated with model change. The fact 
that the (time-varying) effect of executive succession is mediated by the 
(time-invariant) effect of the number of model dimensions that changed 
is substantively important. It gives us some confidence that change in the 
blueprint operates as a cause, rather than as a consequence or correlate, 
of turnover, even though we cannot be certain that all changes in blue- 
prints preceded the turnover spells they are supposed to predict.28 
We find only weak evidence of the hypothesized imprinting effect of 
the organization's first CEO. Controlling for organizational age, the more 
of the firm's history that was "presided over" by the first CEO, the lower 
the subsequent turnover.29 However, this effect is moderated somewhat 
and becomes statistically insignificant when other variables (specifically, 
blueprint change) are controlled for. 
According to model 2 of table 4, firms led by their second or subsequent 
CEO experienced slightly lower turnover.30 However, this effect tends to 
be pronounced only in specifications that also control for model change. 
27 In a specification with CEO change (time-varying) and number of dimensions of 
model change (time-invariant) as regressors, the effect of CEO change is 0.280 (z = 
1.494; P = .135), whereas the effect of model change remains strong and significant 
(b = 0.643; z = 4.931; P <.001). 
28 We also find a modest positive effect of changing the CEO on turnover in a standard 
"fixed effects" model that controls entirely for between-firm variation in turnover and 
includes only time-varying independent variables (results available on request). How- 
ever, the size and significance of the effects are reduced considerably if a time-varying 
measure of the cumulative number of CEOs in the firm is also added to the specification, 
which has a significant negative effect on turnover in the fixed-effects model. 
29 In a specification with just those two covariates, first CEO duration has a strong 
negative effect on turnover (b = -0.186; z = -2.345; P = .019). 
30 In supplementary analyses that included spells for firms that had not yet designated 
a CEO, we also found that companies experienced significantly lower turnover before 
appointing their first CEO (relative to the omitted category, first CEO), even controlling 
for organizational age (results available on request). We suspect that appointing a CEO 
after a firm has functioned for some time without one destabilizes organizations for 
two reasons: (1) it signals a move to a more business-like and hierarchical approach, 
which often conflicts with the original vision of the founders; and (2) designating one 
of the founders (or an outsider) as CEO after a period of collective control often causes 
the remaining founders to feel disenfranchised and to depart, sometimes taking other 
employees with them. 
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This is because firms with a second or subsequent CEO are significantly 
more likely to have experienced a model change, resulting in higher turn- 
over; net of that tendency, however, such firms actually display somewhat 
lower turnover. In other words, if we compare two firms that both altered 
their original blueprint dramatically, the estimates of model 2 of table 4 
imply that a firm still being run by its first CEO will have slightly higher 
turnover than one in which the initial CEO has been replaced. We spec- 
ulate that this result reflects the nature of implicit contracts. Founders 
generally establish the implicit contracts with employees that are embed- 
ded in the organizational blueprint; hence, it might be more contentious 
for a founder-CEO to alter that blueprint and to remain at the helm, as 
a continuing reminder to employees of how the enterprise has strayed 
from its initial model, than it is for a newcomer CEO.31 
Turnover increases with the length of time since a firm first received 
venture capital. Venture capitalists (VCs) often help young organizations 
formalize and fill key managerial and technical roles (Baron et al. 1999b), 
especially as their relationship with the firm develops over time, because: 
(1) they often maintain an initial hands-off approach; (2) if the enterprise 
is proceeding on a path towards going public, VCs want to ensure that 
the firm possesses the management capability and organizational routines 
to handle this transition; and (3) if the firm is doing poorly, VCs will 
frequently insist on changes in management and/or organizational routines 
(using their board positions to bring this about). The effect of venture 
capital in model 2 of table 4 might capture turnover that is induced when 
VCs facilitate bureaucratization of firms and the replacement of early 
employees.32 Turnover appears to decrease somewhat the longer a firm 
has been public. This result is consistent with qualitative observations 
from our interviews about disruptive effects that accompany the initial 
public offering (IPO). Respondents noted that going public can disrupt 
organizations in a variety of ways-for instance, requiring new sorts of 
skills (e.g., financial reporting, public and investor relations) not previously 
represented among employees, which might require both adding new 
31 Consistent with that conjecture, adding an interaction term between the cumulative 
number of CEOs and the number of dimensions that changed in the blueprint to model 
2 of table 4 produces a negative effect that approaches statistical significance (b = 
-0.169; z = -1.634; P = .102, two-tailed), and the main effect for number of CEOs 
is no longer significant. Thus, turnover associated with changing the model is greatest 
for companies still being led by their first CEO at the beginning of a spell. 
32 Consistent with that interpretation, note that the effect of venture capital on turnover 
becomes insignificant after controlling for the CEO's organizational blueprint (model 
3), which VCs presumably are likely to help shift toward bureaucracy. In addition, 
supplementary analyses reveal that firms in which the CEO championed the bureau- 
cratic model were significantly more likely to have venture capital and to have had 
it longer than all other firms. 
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kinds of employees and replacing some individuals as well. Moreover, 
respondents emphasized that going public often represents a financial and 
symbolic milestone, which, once surpassed, can leave a motivational void. 
One founder-CEO of a company engaged in biotechnology instrumen- 
tation told our research team: 
We worried about the IPO a lot because from the earliest days that was a 
clear corporate focal point. Get to the IPO point, get the company public. 
It's the big payoff for people who have stock. Every person in our company 
is a stockholder. We grant them options when they join. Everyone worked 
very hard for six years to get to that point. Our concern was, after the IPO 
and after the lockups expire (so that) people have the ability to sell stock, 
we were concerned what the motivation levels in the company would look 
like (and) what we could do to influence that motivation level. One thing 
we are working very diligently on right now is identifying what the next 
corporate milestone will be. 25%-30% growth isn't the kind of corporate 
objective or singularity of purpose that gets people riled up. We are looking 
for something a little more specific, like that $100 million benchmark. We're 
in the process of making a final decision of what that overall, superordinate 
goal is going to be. (ID #23) 
The negative relationship between duration as a public company and 
turnover might also reflect vesting of stock options. Among the spells 
involving public companies, the typical duration as a public company 
was only about two years (with more than 85% of spells involving com- 
panies that had been public less than four years). The tendency for turn- 
over to decline with duration as a public company might reflect the in- 
creasing sway that stock options have as employees approach the vesting 
date when those options can be exercised (often three to five years after 
the initial public offering).33 
As predicted, organizational age has a strong positive effect on employee 
turnover, consistent with the notion that younger technology companies 
are perceived as offering greater technological challenges and larger pros- 
33 In "spline" specifications that restrict the effect of duration to companies that were 
already public, the effect is still strongly negative (b = -0.567), though only marginally 
significant (P = .068). We also experimented with numerous other specifications, in- 
cluding dummy variables denoting whether these events occurred in a given (or im- 
mediately prior) spell and specifications incorporating a time-invariant effect of having 
venture capital or being publicly traded. In some of these models, we found significant 
effects of having received venture capital or gone public in the prior spell, which 
worked in the opposite direction from the effect of duration-that is, turnover declined 
in the spell following VC funding, but increased subsequently; and turnover increased 
in the spell after companies went public, but subsequently declined the longer firms 
had been publicly traded. However, these lagged effects do not persist if employment 
change in the preceding spell is controlled, suggesting that the lagged effects on turnover 
of receiving VC financing or going public simply reflect the short-term impact of those 
events on employment growth and decline. 
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pects for financial gain through stock option grants. In some specifications, 
organizational growth increased turnover, but the magnitude and signif- 
icance of this effect varies depending on the particular specification and 
set of observations involved. Turnover tends to be lower in research and 
manufacturing companies (as contrasted with computer hardware and 
software, medical devices and biotechnology, semiconductors, and tele- 
communications and networking). Finally, in supplementary analyses, we 
controlled for occupational and gender composition at the end of the first 
year of operations for the subset of companies that provided this infor- 
mation. Those controls do not appreciably alter the effects associated with 
founders' employment blueprints or changing the blueprint (results avail- 
able on request). Hence, our findings do not appear to be artifacts of gross 
differences in occupational composition or gender mix. 
Overall, the effects of model change persist even after we control for 
many other factors that could be expected to influence turnover rates, 
including organizational size and growth, age, industry, occupational and 
gender composition, and the duration of venture capital financing and 
public status. 
WHO IS LEAVING: DISENCHANTED OLD GUARD OR MISMATCHED 
NEW GUARD? 
If altering organizational blueprints changes the skills, values, working 
relationships, and routines that have developed within an enterprise, then 
turnover associated with changing blueprints should be concentrated dis- 
proportionately among more senior employees. Our data do not permit a 
direct test of this prediction. However, companies completing our HR 
survey did provide a tenure distribution for the firm (the fraction of the 
labor force with tenure of six months or less, seven to twelve months, 
etc.) at the time of the interview (1994 or 1995). To examine this issue, 
we conducted exploratory analyses, predicting the percentage of employ- 
ees in 1994-95 having six months or less tenure in the firm. These analyses 
were limited to the last spell for which we had information within each 
firm (1994 or 1995). We included as predictors the same covariates as in 
model 2 of table 4, as well as contemporaneous and lagged measures of 
turnover. For firms interviewed in 1995, there is some potential ambiguity 
regarding the time frame to which firms' responses regarding turnover 
rates and tenure distributions pertain. We handled this ambiguity by 
performing the analyses in various ways.34 The key results of interest are 
34 The 1995 survey form asked for the firm's current tenure distribution but inadver- 
tently asked for turnover data pertaining to the first half of 1994 (as we had requested 
for firms interviewed in mid-1994). Some companies interviewed in 1995 provided, on 
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stable across specifications and subsamples analyzed and are unaffected 
by weighting, so we report (in table 7) only one set of those analyses, 
which are unweighted. 
Table 7 reveals that change in the employment blueprint has a strong 
and significant positive effect on the fraction of a firm's workforce having 
tenure of six months or less. In other words, the more a firm had changed 
its organizational blueprint by 1994-95, the larger the fraction of recently 
hired employees on its payroll, even controlling for recent turnover ex- 
perience.35 Because we have controlled for turnover in the analysis, the 
effect of model change cannot be attributed simply to the higher levels 
of turnover experienced by firms that changed their employment blue- 
print. Rather, a more plausible explanation for this effect holds that firms 
experienced turnover disproportionately from their old guard when em- 
ployment blueprints changed, consistent with hypothesis 2. 
This interpretation is buttressed by parallel analyses in table 7, model 
2, that focus on the size of the most senior tenure cohort in the firm (five 
or more years). Companies that changed their employment blueprint most 
have a significantly smaller proportion of old-guard employees. Effects 
of other variables in the analysis seem quite plausible-for instance, the 
their own initiative, turnover data for all of 1994 and the first half of 1995. In one set 
of analyses, we excluded firms that were interviewed in 1995 but that did not provide 
turnover data pertaining to the same time period as the tenure distribution. In other 
analyses, we constructed a new lagged turnover measure for year t - 1, equal to (a) 
1993 turnover for firms interviewed in 1994; (b) turnover in 1994 for firms interviewed 
in 1995 that also provided turnover data for 1995; and (c) turnover in the first half of 
1994 for firms interviewed in 1995 that did not furnish any more recent turnover data. 
In another variant, we restricted the analysis to firms interviewed in 1994. These 
analyses produced results comparable to those reported in table 7, which handles the 
ambiguity by: (a) including a dummy variable for whether or not a given firm provided 
contemporaneous turnover data for the same time period as the tenure distribution; 
(b) controlling for 1994 vs. 1995 interview year; and (c) permitting the effect of lagged 
turnover to vary between firms that did versus did not furnish contemporaneous 
turnover data. 
35 Turnover in the prior year generally has a negative effect on the size of the "new 
guard," presumably because firms experiencing high turnover in the previous year 
hired replacements, who had already accumulated more than six months' seniority 
within the firm. However, model 1 in table 7 reveals an exception: among firms in- 
terviewed in 1995 that did not provide contemporaneous turnover data for 1995, lagged 
turnover exhibits a positive relationship with the fraction of employees hired in the 
last six months. One possible explanation for this result is that these firms (all studied 
in 1995) were (justifiably) confused by the different time frames to which the turnover 
and tenure questions pertained, and they unwittingly reported their tenure distribution 
for 1994 and/or their recent (1995) turnover experience instead of consistently providing 
information pertaining to 1994 or 1995 (i.e., it is because they had a relatively low 
tenure workforce in 1994 that they display higher turnover in 1995). This would 
account for the appearance of a significant positive relationship between reported 
turnover and the size of the recently hired contingent. 
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fraction of senior employees is larger in older companies, in those that 
were larger in their first year of operations, and in those founded along 
commitment lines.36 Recognizing that not all firms in the sample had been 
in existence for five years, we also replicated these analyses on the subset 
of companies that were five years old or more as of the start of the spell, 
and the results (available on request) were comparable to those reported 
in table 7. 
We cannot make strong inferences on this issue, given the considerable 
limitations of the data available to us. However, these exploratory results 
seem consistent with the view that adopting a new organizational model 
increases turnover principally by dislocating the old guard. 
TURNOVER AND ORGANIZATIONAL PERFORMANCE 
We have argued that the tendency for changes in organizational blueprints 
to increase turnover is interesting for numerous reasons, irrespective of 
the relationship between turnover and firm performance. Nonetheless, we 
wish to test the prediction, derived from ecological perspectives, that the 
disruptions occasioned by turnover destabilize organizations and ad- 
versely affect performance. We report a preliminary analysis of the re- 
lationship between turnover and one compelling indicator of performance: 
revenue growth. Bear in mind that many young technology companies 
are incurring significant set-up costs that might dampen profitability, such 
as conducting basic research, developing distribution channels, building 
infrastructure, and so on. Hence, the ability to accelerate the flow of 
revenues is a reasonable indicator of early success in young technology 
companies, one over which the labor force has some control and one that 
is tracked closely by external constituencies and stakeholders. In addition, 
the data we analyze on revenue growth were provided by the companies 
to independent sources-annual reports to the SEC (for public companies) 
and annual editions of the Technology Resource Guide to Greater Silicon 
Valley (a commercial database distributed by CorpTech)-rather than 
directly to us, reducing the chance of any bias. 
We model performance by relating revenues (in $100,000s) in year 
T + 2 to: (a) revenues in year T; (b) average turnover in years T - 1 and 
T; and (c) other controls (described below). We calculated each firm's 
average turnover rate over the last two spells for which it provided data 
(for most firms, 1993 and the first half of 1994; for a few firms, 1994 and 
36 Not surprisingly, with age, size, and growth controlled, the effect of recent turnover 
on the relative size of the most senior tenure cohort is modest. 
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DETERMINANTS OF TENURE DISTRIBUTION OF EMPLOYEES IN I994-95: OLS ESTIMATES 
% WITH SIX MONTHS TENURE % WITH FIVE YEARS TENURE 
OR LESS OR MORE 
VARIABLE b t prob > It 
CEO's vs. founder's model: N dimensions changed .................. 5.078 2.473 .016 
Founder's model: 
Commitment ........................................................... -4.933 -.628 .533 
Star ............................................................-1.1. 76 -.143 .887 
Engineering ...................................................... 2.029 .280 .781 
A utocracy .............................................................. -9.603 - .930 .356 
A berrant ................................................................ -6.728 - .916 .363 
Turnover (square root), prior year ...................................... 5.682 3.078 .003 
Turnover (square root), prior year x contemporaneous turnover ... -8.135 -3.764 .000 
Employment (square root), start of spell ............................... .302 .673 .504 
Employment (square root), end of year 1 .............................. -.592 -1.008 .317 
Duration of first CEO (years) ........................................... -.135 -.116 .908 
Change in CEO during spell ............................................ 3.636 .747 .458 
2 + CEOs as of start of spell ........................................... 1.162 .241 .811 
Duration of VC funding (years, square root) .......................... -2.878 -1.601 .115 
Duration of public status (years, square root) ......................... .775 .226 .822 
Age at start of spell (years) .............................................. - .792 - .692 .492 
b t prob > I t 
-4.562 -2.051 .045 
23.604 2.773 .007 
11.992 1.346 .183 
7.813 .994 .324 
9.037 .808 .422 
12.150 1.527 .132 
-.227 -.113 .910 
-.239 -.102 .919 
.521 1.070 .289 
2.422 3.807 .000 
-1.420 -1.124 .266 
2.497 .474 .637 
-2.171 -.415 .680 
1.171 .601 .550 
-4.628 -1.246 .218 
4.512 3.640 .001 
Industry: 
M anufacturing ......................................................... -4.552 -.642 .523 -12.532 -1.633 .108 
Research ............................................................... -3.511 -.351 .727 3.431 .316 .753 
Firm-provided contemporaneous turnover data ....................... 9.432 1.154 .253 -5.098 -.576 .567 
Interview year (1995 vs. 1994) .......................................... -11.484 -1.382 .172 8.574 .952 .345 
Constant ....................... ................................... . 22,922.940 1.383 .172 -17,123.540 -.954 .344 
R2 ......................... ................................................. .494 .621 
prob > F .......................... ...............................001 .000 
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the first half of 1995).37 We transform revenues into the square root metric 
to deal with nonlinearities and to accommodate firms with zero revenues 
at either or both time points. The regressors include firm age at year T, 
the time period to which turnover data pertain for the firm (1993-94 or 
1994-95), change in the organizational blueprint (number of dimensions, 
0-3), and employment growth (the ratio of employment in 1994 to 1993). 
The last variable is included to control for the possibility that any observed 
effect of turnover on revenue growth reflects downsizing. 
Table 8 reports WLS estimates for the 54 companies with complete 
data.38 The table reveals a significant negative effect of turnover on rev- 
enue growth, consistent with hypothesis 3. This effect of turnover is quite 
robust across different specifications, functional forms, and measures of 
turnover.39 Thus, changes in the organizational model not only foster 
turnover, but that turnover appears to have adverse consequences for 
organizational performance, at least in the short run, consistent with the 
ecological perspective. 
ISSUES OF CAUSALITY AND OMITTED VARIABLES 
The available data do not permit definitive conclusions about the causal 
relationships between model change, turnover rates, and organizational 
performance. We cannot tell for sure when employment models changed 
(if they did), and hence causality could run in the other direction: firms 
experiencing higher turnover might change their employment models in 
an effort to stem that turnover. Though we cannot rule out this competing 
account, various pieces of evidence argue against it. First, recall that we 
found that the (time-varying) effects of CEO succession on turnover tend 
to vanish once we control for model change. In other words, our time- 
37 Firms generally reported on turnover through the middle of the year in which they 
were interviewed (1994 or 1995). Consequently, because the turnover rate reported for 
year T pertains only to first half of that year, whereas the report for year T - 1 pertained 
to an entire year, we weighted the rate for T- 1 twice the rate for T in calculating 
our measure of average turnover. 
38 Not surprisingly, the revenue growth data are heteroscedastic, with larger error 
variance among smaller firms, so we weight observations as a function of 1994 em- 
ployment. Other weighting schemes, such as revenues at year T or employment av- 
eraged over several years, produce comparable results, as do analyses that control for 
the possibility of non-random missing data (detailed results available on request). 
39 In supplementary analyses, e.g., we also controlled for other potential determinants 
of organizational performance, such as changes in CEO, the fraction of the firm's 
workforce in sales occupations (and change in that fraction since founding), and 
whether and for how long the firm had been public and/or received venture capital 





DETERMINANTS OF REVENUE GROWTH: WLS REGRESSION 
Variable b ,3 t P 
Revenues in $100,000 (square root), year T ............. 1.198 .939 31.426 <.001 
Average annual turnover rate, years T- 1 and T ..... -.124 -.094 -2.973 .005 
Employment growth (ratio of year T to T - 1 ) ........ .989 .087 3.376 .002 
CEO's vs. founder's model: N dimensions changed ... .541 .046 1.385 .173 
Firm age, year T ......................................... -.210 -.044 -1.649 .106 
Indicator for year T* ..................................... -1.309 -.030 -1.087 .283 
Constant ............................................... 2.529 1.811 .077 
NOTE. 
-Dependent variable is the square root of revenues (in $100,000s) for year T + 2. Observations 
(N=54) weighted by 1994 employment size. Mean (SD) of dependent variable is 12.601 (11.7243), based 
on weighted data. R2 = .970; adjusted R2 = .967. 
* 1995 = 1; 1994 = 0. 
invariant measure of model change mediates the effects of the time- 
varying measures of CEO succession and cumulative number of CEOs. 
This suggests that executive succession disrupts organizations when it 
entails changes in employment blueprints. Second, study of respondent 
interview transcripts reveals numerous mentions of changes in premises 
("culture") as being disruptive and divisive. But, we cannot find any men- 
tions of changes in premises in response to unacceptably high (or low) 
turnover. 
Moreover, several results in table 5 make no sense, in our view, under 
reverse causality. For instance, turnover is particularly high for changes 
from aberrant blueprints to autocracy (row 15b), from one nontype model 
to another (row 9), and from commitment or star to aberrant (row 7). 
Firms facing high turnover seem unlikely to have responded by under- 
taking these particular transitions, whereas it is straightforward to un- 
derstand why these transitions might cause high turnover. 
We also investigated whether the arrival of a new CEO, changes to 
the organizational model, and high turnover might all arise because of 
some unobserved crisis. We found that distinguishing spells in which a 
firm's employment declined by 10% or more does not alter materially the 
pattern of findings we reported above, suggesting our results do not simply 
capture large-scale downsizings.40 We also utilized qualitative information 
from interviews and surveys to code whether the founder reported that 
any of the following events occurred within a given firm-year spell: (1) 
40 As one might expect, there was moderate positive effect of current employment 
decline (during the spell) on turnover (e.g., in a model only controlling for age, b = 
0.499; z = 2.158; P = .031). However, the other covariates in our model capture many 
of the factors associated with the likelihood of decline, and controlling for those var- 
iables weakens the effect (b = 0.378; z = 1.451; P = .147). 
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major downsizings or office closings; (2) general financial or legal turmoil, 
such as large losses, cash flow problems, market collapse, and law suits; 
(3) major executive changes; and (4) other executive changes (e.g., de- 
parture of a chief technical officer). All four dislocating events have pos- 
itive effects on turnover. Nonetheless, the effect of changing the organi- 
zational blueprint remains positive and highly significant even when we 
control for these milestone events. Nor were the results appreciably 
changed when we included controls for evidence of a change in business 
strategy within the firm. These supplementary results offer some reas- 
surance that our analyses do not overlook some major factor that produced 
the observed associations between changes in employment blueprints, 
turnover, and organizational performance. 
CONCLUSION 
Organizational theorists, particularly ecologists, have emphasized the dis- 
ruptive effects of fundamental organizational change. Such change is 
thought to destabilize organizations primarily by altering the premises, 
values, and routines that organizational members have come to internalize 
(for a programmatic statement, see Hannan and Freeman [1984]). Ac- 
cordingly, we have tried to get closer to the mechanisms at the heart of 
theories of organizational inertia, by (1) operationalizing the premises 
(employment models) on which founders built their new organizations, 
(2) measuring changes over time in those premises, (3) relating those 
changes to employee turnover, and (4) exploring the effect of turnover on 
organizational performance. If altering organizational premises dislocates, 
then this should be clearly manifested in turnover, especially among the 
most senior employees within an organization. Turnover seems an espe- 
cially appropriate indicator of the disruptive effects of organizational 
change within the setting we examined-high-technology companies in 
Silicon Valley-because retaining the key human assets in young tech- 
nology firms is often viewed by senior management, investors, and other 
informed parties as a crucial requirement for organizational survival and 
success. 
We found considerable evidence that changing organizational blue- 
prints fuels employee turnover, which is concentrated disproportionately 
among old-guard employees. Turnover, in turn, adversely affects the 
ability 
of young firms to grow their revenues (at least in the short run), a crucial 
dimension of performance for emerging technology companies. On bal- 
ance, our results support the claim by neoinstitutionalists and organiza- 
tional ecologists (following Stinchcombe 1965) that cultural blueprints are 
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superimposed by founders on nascent organizations, as well as ecologists' 
claim that altering such blueprints is disruptive and destabilizing. 
A broad conclusion of this analysis, and of others using the SPEC data, 
is that origins matter. Future research should devote more attention to 
conceptualizing and measuring how cultural blueprints are selected and 
imprinted on organizations during their infancy; how they are sustained, 
modified, or discarded over time. Such studies would not only sharpen 
organizational theory but also shed light on some important real-world 
issues, such as the conditions under which firms find it relatively easy or 
difficult to merge or to transplant a particular organizational model into 
a new country or line of business. Moreover, additional work along these 
lines is needed to gauge whether our two main findings-that changes in 
employment blueprints fuel turnover in Silicon Valley high-tech start-ups, 
and that turnover in turn adversely affects organizational perform- 
ance-generalize to other organization-building activities, other kinds of 
enterprises, other environments, and other stages of organizational 
development. 
However, pursuing this research agenda will require some adjustments 
to conventional research methodology. It obviously requires collecting 
observations that pertain to multiple points in time, beginning at the 
origins of the enterprise. It also requires analyzing the resulting panel 
data in non-standard ways. As we noted above, the current standard in 
analyzing panel data on organizations is a fixed-effects approach. How- 
ever, each organization's initial conditions are constant over its history. 
Thus, origins are swept out of the picture in a fixed-effects analysis. What 
seems needed is to employ analytic methods, such as those used in this 
article, that allow flexible specification of models in which both fixed and 
age-varying characteristics affect levels and changes in outcomes of in- 
terest. Further development and refinement of such approaches should 
be high on the agenda for organizational analysis. 
Our detailed analyses of firms' transitions suggest that the disruptive 
effects of changing organizational blueprints depend significantly on firms' 
origin and destination states. Abandoning a coherent model proved to be 
particularly destabilizing, especially if the founder embraced the com- 
mitment or star model, but not if the firm migrated away from bureauc- 
racy or autocracy. Similarly, firms experienced markedly different turn- 
over rates in transitioning to particular destination states, such as 
bureaucracy, as a function of their initial blueprint. The engineering 
model, in contrast, appeared to be relatively more flexible and adaptable 
(i.e., easier to dismantle and easier to migrate to) than various other mod- 
els. Perhaps this offers some insight into its widespread prevalence in 
Silicon Valley. Not only does the engineering model seem to be a relatively 
hospitable origin and destination state, but retaining that model over time 
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might also expose firms to less severe forms of misalignment than, say, 
retaining the commitment or star or autocratic model. Put differently, the 
engineering model might have less upside but also less downside risk, 
compared to more fragile and distinctive models, such as the commitment 
or star blueprint, which entail greater potential returns and risks. Organ- 
izational ecologists might profitably examine how different blueprints or 
models fare competitively under different environmental circumstances. 
Scholars and practitioners alike extol the virtues of creating and sus- 
taining a coherent and consistent system of practices concerning employ- 
ment relations. Yet our results suggest that complementarity, consistency, 
and salience are not unqualified assets for an organizational model. Those 
very same attributes might help explain, for instance, the high turnover 
that firms experienced when moving to bureaucracy or autocracy: if Sil- 
icon Valley "techies" tend to dislike bureaucracy and autocracy, they dis- 
like them most in their purest, most consistent, and most salient incar- 
nations. We still know remarkably little about the parameters and 
consequences of consistency: what determines the degree to which a sys- 
tem of beliefs or HR practices gets perceived as consistent, and how/when 
organizations specifically benefit from such consistency (for a notable ex- 
ception, see Ichniowski, Shaw, and Prennushi [1997]). 
Moreover, achieving and sustaining consistency in employment systems 
raises complicated dynamic trade-offs. Some transition paths from foun- 
der's to CEO's blueprint seem to be particularly disruptive for organi- 
zations, underscoring the point that organizational design should attend 
to more than just getting the model "right." It should also balance the 
benefits of getting the right model against the costs associated with tran- 
sitioning to that model. As an organization and its environment change, 
the merits of a given model are likely to change as well. However, the 
economic, social, and psychological costs associated with dismantling the 
previous blueprint and implementing a new one might outweigh the con- 
tent advantages offered by the new blueprint. Hence, in some ecologies 
and for some strategies, adhering faithfully to a second-best (or even third- 
best) model might be superior to rapid oscillation among shorter-lived, 
first-best models. This issue of balancing stability versus change-and 
weighing the benefits of altering organizational arrangements against the 
adjustment costs involved in making those changes-has received little 
attention from organizational analysts and those interested in employment 
systems and human resource practices. The strong complementarities 
among elements of a firm's employment system, coupled with employees' 
strong emotional attachments to personnel practices, might make these 
trade-offs particularly complex in the domain of human resource man- 
agement. Future research should examine these trade-offs and how they 
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vary across types of organizations, environments, and employment 
practices. 
REFERENCES 
Barnett, William P., and Glenn R. Carroll. 1995. "Modeling Internal Organizational 
Change." Annual Review of Sociology 21:217-36. 
Baron, James N., M. Diane Burton, and Michael T. Hannan. 1996. "The Road Taken: 
The Origins and Evolution of Employment Systems in Emerging High-Technology 
Companies." Industrial and Corporate Change 5:239-76. 
.1999. "Engineering Bureaucracy: The Genesis of Formal Policies, Positions, 
and Structures in High Technology Firms." Journal of Law, Economics, and 
Organization 15:1-41. 
Baron, James N., Michael T. Hannan, and M. Diane Burton. 1999a. "Building the 
Iron Cage: Determinants of Managerial Intensity in the Early Years of 
Organizations." American Sociological Review 64:527-47. 
. 1999b. "Determinants of Managerial Intensity in the Early Years of 
Organizations." Research Paper no. 1550. Stanford University, Graduate School of 
Business. 
Baron, James N., and David M. Kreps. 1999. Strategic Human Resources: Frameworks 
for General Managers. New York: Wiley. 
Burton, M. Diane. 1995. The Evolution of Employment Systems in High Technology 
Firms. Ph.D. dissertation. Stanford University, Department of Sociology. 
. 1999. "Employment Models in Entrepreneurial Companies." Manuscript. 
Harvard University, Harvard Business School. 
. 2001. "The Company They Keep: Founders' Models for Organizing High- 
Technology Firms." In The Entrepreneurship Dynamic, edited by Claudia Bird 
Schoonhoven and Elaine Romanelli. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, in 
press. 
Carroll, Glenn R., and Michael T. Hannan. 2000. The Demography of Corporations 
and Industries. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. 
Carroll, Glenn R., and J. Richard Harrison. 1998. "Organizational Demography and 
Culture: Insights from a Formal Model and Simulation." Administrative Science 
Quarterly 43:637-67. 
Edwards, Richard C. 1979. Contested Terrain: The Transformation of the Workplace 
in the Twentieth Century. New York: Basic Books. 
Fligstein, Neil. 1987. "The Intraorganizational Power Struggle: The Rise of Finance 
Presidents in Large Corporations." American Sociological Review 52:44-58. 
. 1990. The Transformation of Corporate Control. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press. 
Fligstein, Neil, and Haldor Byrkjeflot. 1996. "The Logic of Employment Systems." Pp. 
11-35 in Social Differentiation and Social Inequality, edited by James N. Baron, 
David B. Grusky, and Donald J. Treiman. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press. 
Friedman, Stewart D., and Kathleen Saul. 1991. "A Leader's Wake: Organization 
Member Reactions to CEO Succession." Journal of Management 17:617-42. 
Greenhouse, Steven. 1999. "Angered by H.M.O.'s lTeatment, More Doctors Are Joining 
Unions." New York Times (February 4): Al, A25. 
Guillen, Mauro F. 1994. Models of Management: Work, Authority, and Organization 
in a Comparative Perspective. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Hannan, Michael T. 1998. "Rethinking Age Dependence in Organizational Mortality: 
Logical Formalizations." American Journal of Sociology 104:85-123. 
Hannan, Michael T., M. Diane Burton, and James N. Baron. 1996. "Inertia and Change 
1011 
American Journal of Sociology 
in the Early Years: Employment Relations in Young, High-Technology Firms." 
Industrial and Corporate Change 5:503-36. 
Hannan, Michael T., and John Freeman. 1984. "Structural Inertia and Organizational 
Change." American Sociological Review 49:149-64. 
Huber, Peter J. 1967. "The Behavior of Maximum Likelihood Estimates under Non- 
Standard Conditions." Pp. 221-33 in Proceedings of the Fifth Berkeley Symposium 
in Mathematical Statistics, and Probability, edited by Lucien M. Le Cam and Jerzy 
Neyman. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. 
Ichniowski, Casey, Kathryn Shaw, and Giovanna Prennushi. 1997. "The Effects of 
Human Resource Management Practices on Productivity: A Study of Steel Finishing 
Lines." American Economic Review 87:291-313. 
Kesner, Idalene F., and Dan R. Dalton. 1994. "Top Management Turnover and CEO 
Succession : An Investigation of the Effects of Turnover on Performance." Journal 
of Management Studies 3:701-13. 
Liang, Kung-Yee, and Scott L. Zeger. 1986. "Longitudinal Analysis Using Generalized 
Linear Models." Biometrika 73:13-22. 
Milgrom, Paul, and John Roberts. 1992. Economics, Organization, and Management. 
Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall. 
1995. "Complementarities and Fit: Strategy, Structure, and Organizational 
Change in Manufacturing." Journal of Accounting and Economics 19:179-208. 
Mobley, William H. 1982. Employee Turnover: Causes, Consequences, and Control. 
Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley. 
Pfeffer, Jeffrey. 1983. "Organizational Demography." Pp. 299-357 in Research in 
Organizational Behavior, vol. 5. Edited by L. L. Cummings and Barry M. Staw. 
Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press. 
Price, James L. 1977. The Study of Turnover. Ames: Iowa State University Press. 
Saxenian, AnnaLee. 1994. Regional Advantage: Culture and Competition in Silicon 
Valley and Route 128. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 
Shenhav, Yehouda. 1995. "From Chaos to Systems: The Engineering Foundations of 
Organization Theory, 1879-1932." Administrative Science Quarterly 40:557-85. 
StataCorp. 1999. Stata Statistical Software: Release 6.0. College Station, Tex.: Stata 
Corporation. 
Staw, Barry M. 1980. "The Consequences of Turnover." Journal of Occupational 
Behavior 1:253-73. 
Stinchcombe, Arthur L. 1965. "Social Structure and Organizations." Pp. 142-93 in 
Handbook of Organizations, edited by James G. March. Chicago: Rand McNally. 
Virany, Beverly, Michael L. Tushman, and Elaine Romanelli. 1992. "Executive 
Succession and Organization Outcomes in Turbulent Environments: An 
Organization Learning Approach." Organization Science 3:72-91. 
White, Halbert. 1982. "Maximum Likelihood Estimation of Misspecified Models." 
Econometrica 50:1-25. 
Zeger, Scott L., and Kung-Yee Liang. 1986. "Longitudinal Data Analysis for Discrete 
and Continuous Outcomes." Biometrics 42:121-30. 
1012 
